ELIOT COHEN blast Iraq Study Group

No Way to Win a War
Iraq Study Group: A fatuous process yielded fatuous results.

BY ELIOT A. COHEN
Sunday, December 10, 2006 12:01 a.m. EST
Published in Wall Street Journal
Link: http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110009364

The theory of the thing is very peculiar indeed. You are in the middle of a war--a hard war, a war that is going badly. If the government has bogged down, if the people inside have gone stale, you would say that the sound thing, the Churchillian or Lincolnian or Rooseveltian thing, would be, first, to fire a bunch of officials (generals as well as top civilians), promote or bring in fresh talent, and put together a small group of people to take a new and unillusioned look. Those people would report back in secrecy to the president and his most senior advisers and aides.

They would consist of experienced soldiers and civilians in whom the president (who, after all, has to make the strategic decisions, and is the accountable executive) has trust. There would not be many of them, a half dozen or so, and they would have to be hardy enough to visit the war zone for several weeks, talking not just to politicians and generals but to captains and sergeants. They would go see things for themselves. They would visit a forward operating base near Tikrit; they would spend some time with Iraqi soldiers in Taji; they would take their chances in a convoy to al Asad, or even a patrol in Tal Afar.

They--not their staff of a few soldiers and secretaries--would do the probing, digging, thinking, discussing and, above all, the writing. The chairman of the group would insist that they air their disagreements candidly and thoroughly in front of the president, engaging in a debate that might last a day, perhaps longer. The rest of us would not find out about the panel until months, or even years, after it reported back; maybe not until the war was over.

The administration's congressional critics (including those of its own party) came up with a different solution: the Iraq Study Group (ISG), which has now produced a document that consists of 50 pages of recommendations, preceded by a 40-page thumbnail sketch of the current situation in Iraq and 50 pages of maps, lists of people, and full-length biographies of the commissioners. This is a group composed, for the most part, of retired eminent public officials, most with limited or no expertise in the waging or study of war. It consists of individuals carefully selected with an eye to diverse partisan and other irrelevant personal characteristics. These worthies, with not one chairman but two (for balance, of course), turned to several score experts known to disagree vehemently with one another about the best course of action to be pursued in Iraq.

Some of the commission members and their advisers cordially detest the president and his administration and opposed him and his war from the outset; others were equally passionate in their defense of both the man and the conflict. And yet this diverse group had an overwhelming mandate, from the beginning, to produce a consensus document. The commission members spent four days in Iraq, and with the exception of a one-day foray by former Marine Chuck Robb, they stayed in the Green Zone, that bubble of palaces and residences that has little to do with the real Iraq of Basra, Kirkuk, Ramadi, Baquba and Mosul. At the end, they had breakfast with the president and a few hours later posted their conclusions on the Internet for all the world to ponder. There is something of farce in all this, an invocation of wisdom from a cohesive Washington elite that does not exist, a desperate wish to believe in the gravitas and the statecraft of grave men (and women) who can sort out the mess in which the country finds itself.

A fatuous process yields, necessarily, fatuous results. "Iraq's neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability"--a statement only somewhat ameliorated by the admission that some are even "undercutting stability," which sounds as though Syria and Iran were being downright rude, rather than providing indispensable assistance to those who have filled the burn wards of Walter Reed, the morgue in Baghdad, and the cemetery at Arlington. The selected remedy is, first and foremost, rather like the ISG's credo for its own functioning, consensus. "The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region," as if our chief failure with Bashar Assad or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lies with the hitherto unnoticed laziness or rhetorical ineptitude of our diplomats, or as though Europe, Saudi Arabia and Israel have not yet figured out that stability in Iraq is a good thing. "Syria should control its border" and "Iran should respect Iraq's sovereignty."

No kidding--but who is going to make them? That perennial solution, "resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict," makes its appearance, including direct negotiations between Israel and Palestinians, but only with "those who accept Israel's right to exist." The report conveniently forgets that the elected leaders of Palestine do not, in fact, accept Israel's right to exist. And it also neglects the grim reality that one of the most terrible things about Gaza, and possibly the West Bank as well, is that no one, not even Hamas, is really in charge.

Part of Iran's price for easing up on us in Iraq is pretty clearly taking the heat off its nuclear program; the ISG recommends that that issue "should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany." Well, what deal should the U.S. be willing to cut on Iranian nuclear weapons? Do we think the Iranians would deliver? And what are the long-term consequences?

War, and warlike statecraft, is a hard business, and though this is supposed to be a report dominated by "realists," there is nothing realistic in failing to spell out the bloody deeds, grim probabilities and dismal consequences associated with even the best course of action. Indeed, some parts of the report read as sheer fantasy--Recommendation 15, for example, which provides that part of the American deal with Syria should include the latter's full cooperation in investigating the Hariri assassination, verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah, and its support for persuading Hamas to recognize Israel.

The prescriptions for internal processes in Iraq are only somewhat better. The ISG argues that American forces should shift to developing Iraqi security forces and backing them up, which is more or less the course we are on now. It talks of milestones for Iraqi performance, as if Iraqi benchmarking were more a problem than Iraqi will, and Iraqi will more the problem than Iraqi capability. It suggests announcing our own planned redeployments without considering the most obvious consequence, which is that Iraqis of many political hues will decide that the Americans are leaving, and the time has come to cut deals with Jaish al Mahdi, or the Badr organization, or al Qaeda in Iraq, or any of the other cutthroat outfits infesting that bleeding country.

Quite apart from the psychological impact of our actions, there is the sober fact that the Iraqi army is small, 138,000-strong (and that number probably overstated), and that building effective security forces takes time. The 188,000-man police forces are corrupt, riddled with militia influence, and in need of a thorough overhaul. We cannot build the Iraqi security forces without a substantial combat presence. Nor is the problem merely one of training, as Iraqi corporals driving around in pickup trucks without functional radios might have sourly pointed out, had they had the chance to talk to a Study Group member.

At least the ISG has given considerable thought to preparing us for future conflict. Consider Recommendations 47 and 48. Congress, they declare, should allocate money to repair the clapped-out equipment the Army and Marines will bring back from Iraq. This is no doubt better than, say, heaving Bradley infantry fighting vehicles overboard on the way back to American ports in order to provide a home for new coral reefs. "As [American] redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize training and education of forces that have returned to the United States in order to restore the force to full combat capability." Pentagon planners would do well to pursue this plan rather than give the troops six months of leave and then having them paint the sorely neglected rocks outside the sergeant major's office.

The great war leaders, in their private deliberations, shied away from vagueness. Haziness about ends and means, about what to do and how to do it, is a mark of strategic ineptitude; in war it gets people killed. But a Churchill could only call the flattening of German cities "terror bombing" in private.

Thus, unsurprisingly, in a public document of this kind, euphemism and imprecision abound. The U.S. needs to give "disincentives" to Syria and Iran: But the real question has always been whether we are willing to use a variety of overt and covert means--from bombing insurgent safe houses to sabotaging refineries, from mining harbors to supporting their own insurgents--to do so. And, in fact, the report mentions no means for squeezing either country.

True, as James Baker irritably noted at the press conference releasing the report, the U.S. talked to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But as the U.S. did so it also bankrupted the U.S.S.R. in an arms race, undermined its client governments in Eastern Europe by supporting Polish labor unions, and killed its soldiers by providing surface-to-air missiles to Afghan guerrillas. Real pain, and not merely tough talk sweetened by a bucket of goodies, paves the way for successful negotiations with brutal opponents.

What we need in Iraq is not a New Diplomatic Offensive (capitals in the original) so much as energy and competence in fighting the fight. From the outset of the Iraq war much of our difficulty has stemmed not so much from failures to find the right strategy, as from an astounding and depressing inability to implement the strategic and operational choices we have nominally made.

This inability has come from things as personal as picking the wrong people for key positions, in the apparent belief that generals are interchangeable cogs in a counterinsurgency machine. It has come from an unwillingness or inability to grab the bureaucracy by the throat and make it act--which is why, three years after the insurgency began, we still send soldiers out to risk roadside bomb attacks in overweight Humvees when there are half a dozen commercially available armored vehicles designed to minimize the effects of such blasts. It is why--although the government has declared long before the ISG issued its report that training the Iraqis is Job One--we still embed fewer than a dozen American advisers in an Iraqi battalion when the right number is three to five times that many.

We have not come up to the brink of failure because we did not know how important it is to employ young Iraqi men or to keep detained insurgents out of circulation or to prevent militia penetration of the security forces by vetting the commanders of those forces. We have known these things--but we have not done these things.

The creation of the Iraq Study Group reflects the vain hope that well-meaning, senior, former public officials can find ideas that have not already occurred to people inside government; that those new ideas can redeem incompetent execution and insufficient resources; that salvation can come from a Washington establishment whose wisdom was exaggerated in its heyday, and which has in any event succumbed to a kind of political-intellectual entropy since the 1960s; that a public commission can do the work of oversight that Congress has shirked for five years in the misguided belief that it would thus support an administration struggling to do its best in a difficult situation. This is no way to run a war, and most definitely, no way to win it.

Mr. Cohen is Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

Joe Wilson -Background information

Notes:
1. Wilson, who was in charge of the Embassy in Iraq during the first Gulf War under Bush 41
2. Wilson was the last American to speak personally with Saddam Hussein before the
war begain,
3. Wilson and was responsible for taking care of some 125 Americans who had sought refuge in the American Embassy there when they were not allowed by Saddam to leave the country just prior to the war
4. Wilson wrote an article San Jose Mercury News, on October 13, 2002, in which Wilson related his concerns about the pitfalls of the approach to Iraq being taken at the time by both the U.N. and the U.S.
5.In reply to that article, Wilson said that the former President Bush 41 wrote that he had "read your article and I agree with a lot of it."
6.Bush 41's own National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, had contacted him to ask whether he "could walk on over to the White House with the letter" at the time
7. Plame, Wilson's wife, was indeed a "NOC", an agent with "nonofficial cover", the most valuable, secretive and vulnerable of CIA assets at the time of her outing.
8."The CIA said [my wife] was not the person to have authorized my trip. They've repeated that time and time again." ( Though not in this article, it has been claimed that it was actually Cheney who had picked Wislon to go to Nigers- Cheney would deny this.)
blogged on http://www.bradblog.com/?p=1591

posted by here by Paul Grant (follower of Basho)
See related post:
23 Administration Officials Involved In Plame Leak

Video Documentary- Part 4 on the Neocons

Joe Wilson's Op-Ed for New York Times


BLOGGED BY Brad ON 7/13/2005 2:45PM
JOE WILSON: 'The President should fire Rove'!
The Ambassador Strikes Back, Answers to the Right Wing Spin Machine
*** A BRAD BLOG EXCLUSIVE ***

Ambassador Joseph Wilson fired back today at the Rightwing Spin Machine, which, having been issued marching orders late yesterday in a set of talking points from the RNC, is once again hoping to distract from the potentially treasonous crimes that George W. Bush's top political operative and Deputy Chief of Staff, Karl Rove, is alleged to have committed.

In a phone discussion early this afternoon, Wilson told The BRAD BLOG in no uncertain terms that "the President should fire Rove."

He told us that he'd be appearing on NBC's Today Show tomorrow morning and would be repeating that call.



As well, he told The BRAD BLOG that he planned to read a letter on air which he received from Bush's father, President George H.W. Bush shortly after an article of his was printed in the San Jose Mercury News, on October 13, 2002, in which Wilson related his concerns about the pitfalls of the approach to Iraq being taken at the time by both the U.N. and the U.S.

In reply to that article, Wilson said that the former President wrote that he had "read your article and I agree with a lot of it."



Additionally, Wilson explained, Bush 41's own National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, had contacted him to ask whether he "could walk on over to the White House with the letter" at the time. Which apparently he did.


Wilson also had sent the article to Bush 41's Secretary of State, James Baker.

"None of them responded saying you're a Democratic partisan hack and your views suck," said Wilson.

The above points are notable, because armed with those RNC talking points, Rush Limbaugh, Fox "News" and Friends have today kicked into overdrive smearing and lying about Wilson, claiming that he was against the Iraq War from the get-go.

If fact, Wilson, who was in charge of the Embassy in Iraq during the first Gulf War under Bush 41 (he was the last American to speak personally with Saddam Hussein before the war begain, and was responsible for taking care of some 125 Americans who had sought refuge in the American Embassy there when they were not allowed by Saddam to leave the country just prior to the war), says that it was "a full eight months" after he was sent by the CIA to Niger to investigate claims that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium there, "before I had said anything publicly about what America should consider in regard to a war with Iraq."

"My real concern was always WMD," he told us, "not Regime Change."

That concern was expressed in the October 2002, San Jose Mercury News editorial which apparently George W. Bush's own father and National Security Advisor tended to agree with. Wilson's trip to Niger occurred a full eight months earlier, in February of that same year.


We asked him if he had heard Fox "News'" John Gibson make his deplorable and irresponsible statement yesterday which said that "Karl Rove should receive a medal," because Wilson's wife, covert CIA asset Valerie Plame, "should have been outed."

"Where I come from," slurred Gibson, "we do not want secret spy masters pulling the puppet strings in the background.

Gibson's "logic", such that he has any, seems to be based on the unsupported claims that Plame --- or Wilson's "little wifey" as Gibson condescendingly referred to her --- was "pulling the puppet strings" of national policy from her covert position in the CIA, by sending Wilson to Niger. That was, in Gibson's false claim, because Wilson, "was opposed to the War in Iraq, opposed to Bush policy, and pointedly and loudly said so."

No, he didn't, Mr. Gibson. Never mind those pesky facts. It's only Fox "News" you work for, so we realize such facts are hardly relevant to you receiving your paycheck there.

"That is something that should be out in the open," blathered Gibson, "And the person doing it should be identified and should own up to it. So Rove should get a medal, if he did do what he says he didn't do."

In response, Wilson simply said, "Well, that's a lie. But no surprise there."

In the meantime, despite such pesky facts, the wingnuts also continue to claim that Plame was, in fact, not even a covert asset at the time of her outing.

The BRAD BLOG has learned from several sources, as also confirmed in Time magazine that Plame was indeed a "NOC", an agent with "nonofficial cover", the most valuable, secretive and vulnerable of CIA assets.

In regard to whether she was covert or not at the time of her outing by Rove, Bob Novak or whoever his "two senior administration sources" were, Wilson said, "What I can say is, that the CIA looked at the evidence of what had happened and referred the case to the Justice Department. That means that the CIA may think that a crime has been committed."

On Rightwing Hackery hoping to cynically deflect from the seriousness of the potentially treasonous crime committed by claiming that "Wilson lied" about his wife's involvement in sending him to Niger, Wilson says, "In actual fact, all I've done is repeat what the CIA itself has said since July 22nd, 2003 as reported initially in Newsday by Knut Royce and Tim Phelps."

That Newsday article says [emphasis added]:
A senior intelligence official confirmed that Plame was a Directorate of Operations undercover officer who worked "alongside" the operations officers who asked her husband to travel to Niger.

But he said she did not recommend her husband to undertake the Niger assignment. "They [the officers who did ask Wilson to check the uranium story] were aware of who she was married to, which is not surprising," he said. "There are people elsewhere in government who are trying to make her look like she was the one who was cooking this up, for some reason," he said. "I can't figure out what it could be."

"The CIA said [my wife] was not the person to have authorized my trip. They've repeated that time and time again."

And the Bush Apologists, who suddenly don't seem to care all that much about National Security after all, keep repeating the opposite. Time and time again.

James Baker makes a sugestion :Focus on Mid Eastern Peace

It has been argued that it really wasn't the Weapons of Mass destruction that was the promting point for the US invasion of Iraq. Senior Bush Administration officials insist that Saddam's opposition had doomed American efforts to make peace between the Arabs and the Israelis in the 1980s. This was the basis of the neo-conservative refrain that "the road to Jerusalem runs through Baghdad." Likewise, this mistaken conviction was part of the reason that Washington quickly shifted its attention from Afghanistan to Iraq, in the belief that Saddam somehow stood behind both the Taliban and al-Qa'ida. It is certainly the case that Administration figures regularly played fast and loose with the paltry evidence suggesting any kind of relationship between Saddam and bin Ladin, but it is also the case that they did so because they were certain that it existed, even if there was no evidence to support it and most of the evidence available suggested the opposite.

So perhaps the real reason for the invasion was peace in the Middle East. But because the US has become bogged down in Iraq -progress with the Middle East has been put on the back burner. Baker suggest that now, after Yasser Arafat death - the time to act is now. Below is a good analysis's from Slate Magazine - and both New York Time OP pieces it references.


war stories
The Fastest Way To Send a Message
Why is James Baker talking to the president via the New York Times op-ed page?
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Thursday, Dec. 2, 2004, at 6:12 PM ET

Is there about to be a breakthrough in U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict? If the signs aren't quite hopeful, they're at least extremely intriguing.

Most intriguing is an op-ed piece in today's New York Times by James A. Baker III, urging President George W. Bush to promote the resumption of negotiations, adding, "The time to start is now." The article is fascinating not so much for what it says but for the fact that Baker wrote it at all.

Baker is not merely the man who was secretary of state during the presidency of Bush's father. He also ran the father's re-election campaign. He led W.'s fight against the Florida recount in the 2000 election—which is to say, he's largely responsible for the son's victory. He is widely known as one of the most closely trusted advisers to the entire Bush family. Last year, when Bush tried to persuade European leaders to forgive Iraqi debt, he sent as emissary not his own secretary of state, Colin Powell, but rather, James Baker—as a signal to one and all that the trip was truly serious.

Baker could have called the president on the phone to talk about the Middle East, or any other subject, anytime he wanted. Why did he send the message through the New York Times?

It's worth recalling the last time Baker wrote a Times op-ed piece. It was in August 2002, as the Bush administration was getting set to invade Iraq. In his piece, Baker supported invasion, but he urged Bush not to "go it alone" and to "reject the advice of those who counsel doing so."

The article raised eyebrows all over Washington—and among foreign policy cognoscenti worldwide—for two reasons. First, it amounted to a critique of Bush's foremost security advisers, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from inside his own family's circle. Second, it was widely assumed that Baker would not have published such an article without at least the tacit approval of the president's father himself, who, along with Baker, had put together a genuinely broad and successful coalition for the 1991 Gulf War.

The following month, President Bush did go to the U.N. General Assembly—against the advice of Cheney and Rumsfeld—and delivered a stern, eloquent, and well-received speech, calling on the Security Council to threaten Iraq with "serious consequences" if Saddam continued to thumb his nose at U.N. resolutions. (Bush's unilateralists won out in the end, six months later, but Baker's arguments seemed to hold sway for at least a while.)

Today's op-ed appears to have been designed with a similar purpose—to send a message to the president, with the pressure of publication behind it. In 2002, Baker meant to thwart action that Bush was about to take as a result of his advisers (invading Iraq without a coalition). Now he means to incite Bush to take action (jump-starting Arab-Israeli peace talks) against some of his advisers' inclinations.

The premise of Baker's piece is that Yasser Arafat's death has "created a unique opportunity for negotiating peace between Arabs and Israelis." Yes, he writes, the president should "continue with his goal of spreading democracy in the Middle East," and the January elections in Iraq are a "critical step in the right direction." But promoting Arab-Israeli peace is "imperative"—both in itself and for these larger goals.

"The road to peace," Baker writes, "does not run through just Jerusalem or just Baghdad. … Today it runs through both." This is a clear reference to the slogan that Bush's neoconservative advisers liked to recite before the invasion of Iraq: "The road to Jerusalem runs through Baghdad." In other words, to topple Saddam would be to remove a leading supporter of Palestinian terrorism; moreover, a stable, democratic Iraq would light a blazing trail of freedom across the Middle East. Once this theory proved fanciful, Bush's critics liked to twist the slogan—the road to Baghdad, they said, runs through Jerusalem. In other words, the insurgency can't be defeated—and America's image in the region can't be repaired—until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is addressed. Baker is telling Bush that the critics are right—the road runs both ways.

Baker allows that Palestinian candidates in the upcoming presidential elections must renounce terrorism. Yet he also writes that Israel should announce that, upon the election of such a Palestinian, "it is prepared to resume substantive negotiations for peace without requiring that all terrorist activities cease in advance." The reason is purely pragmatic: Insisting on such a requirement would "simply empower the terrorists themselves to prevent the resumption of peace negotiations."

Following this advice would require Bush to switch his policies and to apply at least a little pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon—in other words, to "reject the advice" (as Baker put it, in the context of Iraq, two years ago) of those in his inner circle who are fine with letting Sharon do whatever he wants, an attitude that may seem "pro-Israel" but that in fact goes against Israel's long-term interests.

Finally, Baker writes that, while the outcome of talks can't be prejudged, "the plan presented by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David in 2000—and rejected by Yasir Arafat—surely offers one plausible place to start." This must have been the hardest passage for Bush to read—as Baker must surely have realized when he wrote it. The primary watchword of George W. Bush's first term was to do the opposite of whatever Bill Clinton did. Baker is telling Bush to get over this neurosis and do the right thing, whatever Clinton may or may not have done.

Baker is probably stepping in at this time, pressuring Bush to get involved in this issue right away, because this is a crucial moment, a rare convergence of opportunities, and Baker—like anyone who's been involved in the delicacies of Middle East peace talks—must be fearful that we might let it pass by.

Violence in the territories has markedly declined since Arafat's death. An apparent moderate, Mahmoud Abbas, is the top candidate to replace Arafat. The announcement by Marwan Barghouti, who is in an Israeli prison for terrorism, that he too might run for the office has been denounced by leading Palestinians and by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

Yet in the face of all these trends, a vacuum looms at the top of America's foreign policy apparatus. Powell is a lame-duck secretary of state whose words and actions carry no weight whatever. His replacement, Condoleezza Rice, won't be confirmed for a couple of months at least. Iraq and now Iran are occupying the little space for attention that foreign issues can occupy. Baker is telling his friend that he has to open that space a bit wider to allow for the Arab-Israeli conflict too; that this conflict may hold the key to settling the other conflicts; and that he shouldn't let his advisers—the same advisers who led him astray on Iraq—toss up obstacles on this one.
Fred Kaplan writes the "War Stories" column for Slate. He can be reached at war_stories@hotmail.com.

**************

mber 2, 2004
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Talking Our Way to Peace
By JAMES A. BAKER III

Houston

Two developments - the re-election of President Bush and the emergence of a new Palestinian leadership in the wake of Yasir Arafat's death - have created a unique opportunity for negotiating peace between Arabs and Israelis.

The president should, of course, continue with his goal of spreading democracy in the Middle East. And the planned elections in Iraq this January are a critical step in the right direction. But it is imperative that the president also actively promote peace between Israelis and Arabs.

Stability in Iraq and peace between Palestinians and Israelis can be pursued at the same time. In fact, working toward the latter improves the chances of attaining the former. The road to peace does not run through just Jerusalem or just Baghdad. That is a false choice. Today it runs through both.

The so-called quartet (the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations), which has been working on a "road map" for peace between the Palestinians and Israelis for several years, supports a two-state solution, as do the vast majority of both Palestinians and Israelis. President Bush certainly favors this goal, and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel has publicly supported it as well, although in April he said that the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza could delay a Palestinian state "for many years."

Only the real hard-liners on both sides - Arabs who refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist and Israelis who want to keep the occupied territories rather than exchange them for a secure peace - prefer a one-state solution. A one-state solution would ultimately mean the end of Israel as a democratic Jewish state and would, of course, also foreclose Palestinian aspirations for their own independent state existing peacefully alongside Israel.

So the real question is how to take advantage of this window of opportunity to achieve that two-state solution. Specifically, what steps should be taken? Who needs to do what?

First, it is critical that negotiations resume. For this to happen, of course, Israel must have a negotiating partner on the Palestinian side. That partner will best emerge from free elections. Elections have been scheduled for Jan. 9, and all who support peace between Israel and the Palestinians have an obligation to do all within their power to see that those elections are successfully held.

Palestinian candidates should clearly and unequivocally renounce terrorism as a means of achieving a political result - and call upon their supporters to do likewise. And those Palestinians should commit themselves to an unequivocal, good-faith effort to crack down on terrorist groups that make a target of Israel.

In exchange, Israel should announce that upon the election of a Palestinian negotiating partner, it is prepared to resume substantive negotiations for peace without requiring that all terrorist activities cease in advance. To require the absence of any terrorist act in advance simply empowers the terrorists themselves to prevent the resumption of peace negotiations.

Also, Israel should do whatever it can to encourage freedom of movement and access to polling places under secure conditions to help such elections succeed. It is encouraging that Israel has indicated that all Palestinians will be permitted to vote in such elections whether they live in Jerusalem or in some other location.

The United States should itself clearly embrace and articulate the unequivocal, good-faith standard for the resumption of dialogue. The United States should further prevail upon Israel to cease settlement activity in the occupied territories pending Palestinian elections and during the resumption of peace negotiations. Washington should also do everything else that it can to encourage both sides to resume meaningful talks. And it should serve, where necessary, as a direct participant in the talks, offering suggestions, brokering compromises and extending assurances.

Finally, the administration must make it unambiguously clear to Israel that while Prime Minister Sharon's planned withdrawal from Gaza is a positive initiative, it cannot be simply the first step in a unilateral process leading to the creation of Palestinian "Bantustans" in the West Bank.

We cannot, of course, prejudge the final outcome of any talks. But the plan presented by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David in 2000 - and rejected by Yasir Arafat - surely offers one plausible place to start.

It is encouraging to witness the quick response from the White House, particularly when President Bush stood with Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain shortly after his re-election and said that he wanted to establish an independent Palestinian state living in peace and security next to Israel. "I intend to use the next four years to spend the capital of the United States on such a state," he said.

While the United States cannot dictate the terms of peace to either party, it can and should actively promote the resumption of negotiations. The time to start is now.

James A. Baker III was secretary of state from 1989 to 1992.

*************

James Baker: Don't go it alone with Iraq
From Kelly Wallace
CNN Washington Bureau

CRAWFORD, Texas (CNN) --Former Secretary of State James Baker Sunday warned President Bush not to "go it alone" against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Writing on the op-ed page of Sunday's New York Times, Baker became the latest member of the first Bush administration to issue cautionary words about a military attack against Iraq.

"Although the United States could certainly succeed, we should try our best not to have to go it alone, and the president should reject the advice of those who counsel doing so," Baker wrote.

"The costs in all areas will be much greater, as will the political risks, both domestic and international, if we end up going it alone or with only one or two countries."

Baker said, however, that he believes the only "realistic way" to bring about regime change is through military force, including "sufficient" ground troops to occupy the country.

"Anyone who thinks we can effect regime change in Iraq with anything less than this is simply not realistic," Baker said.

The former chief diplomat urged Bush to build an international coalition like the one he and the president's father brought together during the Persian Gulf War.

He suggested Bush consider pursuing a U.N. Security Council resolution requiring Iraq to submit to an "intrusive inspections regime" and authorizing "all necessary means" to enforce those inspections.

"Some will argue, as was done in 1990, that going for United Nations authority and not getting it will weaken our case," Baker said.

"I disagree. By proposing to proceed in such a way, we will be doing the right thing, both politically and substantively. We will occupy the moral high ground."

Bush, who is winding up his August vacation at his ranch near here, "welcomes" Baker's advice, said White House press secretary Ari Fleischer.

"It is part of the constructive debate from thoughtful people and it underscores many of the things the president has said about ... the threat [Saddam] presents to the world," Fleischer said.

Fleischer said Bush still has not made a decision about how to bring about a change of Iraqi regimes.

Other former Bush administration officials who have spoken out recently include Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to Bush's father.

Scowcroft, in an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, voiced his opposition to a military attack on Iraq.

Other Republicans strongly back military action and believe the president should pursue such a course, even if he can't bring together an international coalition.

"I'd much prefer to have a lot of allies out there, both in the Middle East and in Western Europe," Sen. James Inhofe, R-Oklahoma, told CNN's "Late Edition."

"I'd like to have the American people solidly behind the president. But again, if the president has to do it, he has to do it. And that's what leadership is all about."

Before any pre-emptive strike on Iraq, some Democrats argue, the president must make the case to the American people.

"What we have is an administration that is beating its breast with all this rhetoric about how they're going to do this or that," said Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Florida, on the same program.

"The president needs the country behind him."

As Bush thinks through options to deal with Saddam, "he will talk to the country about it and he will make the case," a senior administration official said.

To build support in the Arab world for regime change, the State Department is encouraging Iraqi exiles to speak out about the "brutality" of Saddam Hussein, a State Department spokesman said.

Seventeen Iraqi exiles from North America and Europe plan to visit the State Department this week for four days of media training on writing opinion pieces, giving speeches and doing television and radio interviews.

The goal is to make the case that the battle is not between the United States and Iraq, and to convey that the Iraqi people and Iraq's neighbors will be better off without Saddam, U.S. officials said.

Bush will deliver that message personally to Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, in a visit to Bush's Texas ranch.

The president will plead the case to a Saudi government that so far is against a military attack.

The Saudis have also said they will not allow the United States to launch an invasion of Iraq from Saudi soil.