Video: JFK's warnings about Secret Societies

 

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JFK SPEACH ON SECRET SOCIETIES AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Video:: US Marines accused of Massacre in Haditha,

4 Marines Charged In Haditha Killings
Deaths of Iraqi Civilians Also Lead to Dereliction Counts Against 4 Officers

By Josh White and Sonya Geis
Washington Post Staff Writers
Friday, December 22, 2006; A01

Four U.S. Marines were charged with multiple counts of murder yesterday for their alleged roles in the deaths of two dozen civilians in the Iraqi town of Haditha last year. The accusations set up what could be the highest-profile atrocity prosecution to arise from the Iraq war.

In an unusual move, the Marine Corps also charged four officers with crimes related to their alleged failure to investigate and report the Nov. 19, 2005, slayings, which occurred when the Marines conducted a house-to-house sweep and attacked a vehicle after a member of their unit was killed in an ambush.

The separate investigation into how the incident was reported led to dereliction charges against a lieutenant colonel, two captains and a first lieutenant. They are accused of failing to thoroughly investigate and accurately report the slayings to superiors. The lieutenant also faces charges of making a false official statement and obstructing justice, according to the Marine Corps.

None of the murder charges carries a possible death sentence, because the Marines are not accused of premeditated murder. But the charging documents indicate that they did not properly identify their targets, did intend to kill the people in the houses and should have known that their actions could lead to the deaths of innocent civilians.

The 24 civilians were killed in a neighborhood near the spot where a roadside bomb killed a Marine who was driving in a convoy of Humvees. Early media reports suggested that the Marines went on a rampage after Lance Cpl. Miguel "T.J." Terrazas was killed, but they have claimed through their defense lawyers that they were following their rules of engagement when they responded to the attack.

It took the Marine Corps 13 months to charge the men in part because initial reports about the case delivered up the chain of command were incomplete; a public affairs statement about the incident was incorrect; and investigators were not brought in until months later, after a Time magazine reporter asked about the case. Naval Criminal Investigative Service officials have been investigating since March.

Attention to the case increased earlier this year when Rep. John P. Murtha (D-Pa.) alleged after briefings from military officials that the Marines had killed civilians "in cold blood."

In a news conference yesterday afternoon at Camp Pendleton, a Marine base north of San Diego, Col. Stewart Navarre declined to comment on details of the cases.

Each of the Marines was charged in multiple slayings, but Staff Sgt. Frank D. Wuterich, 26, a squad leader with Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, was implicated in 18 deaths. Wuterich faces 13 counts of unpremeditated murder.

Kathleen A. Duignan, executive director of the Washington-based National Institute of Military Justice, said: "I think they know they can't prove premeditated murder, because you need to prove intent." She said prosecutors probably will argue that the Marines did not take due and deliberate care and did not follow rules of engagement.

Defense attorneys are likely to argue that the Marines were following the rules while taking fire and simply made mistakes. Duignan said the case falls into a gray area, where lawful combat could blur into unlawful action.

"It's a very fine line," Duignan said. "It will be a very difficult yet very interesting case."

The charge sheets allege that the Marines failed to properly identify their targets and that Wuterich told his unit to "shoot first and ask questions later."

Iraqis in Haditha have described the incident as a massacre, saying Marines went from house to house indiscriminately shooting at men, women and children. One witness told The Washington Post in May that victims pleaded for their lives and said they were not insurgents, moments before they were shot.

Wuterich has long claimed, through his lawyers, that he was responding to a coordinated attack on his unit and did nothing wrong that day. He and other Marines have told their lawyers that they received small-arms fire from the houses they attacked. They used standard house-clearing techniques to ensure that the threat against them was eliminated from two houses, they have said. The slayings of the civilians -- including women and children -- were an unfortunate result of the Marines' attack, they have argued.

Neal Puckett, one of Wuterich's civilian attorneys, said in an interview yesterday that the allegations do not contradict Wuterich's version of events. Puckett said there is no evidence that the Marines lost control or went on some sort of a rampage.

"It's what happens in wartime. You intend to kill the people you're shooting at," Puckett said. "It would imply that they have no proof of a sweep conducted to punish Iraqis."

Wuterich was later recommended for an award for heroism that said his efforts prevented further injury or death to Marines and civilians.

Lance Cpl. Justin L. Sharratt, 22, is charged with three counts of unpremeditated murder, apparently for the deaths of three men he allegedly shot in a third house the Marines entered later on Nov. 19.

Sharratt has maintained his innocence to his family. His parents, Theresa and Daryl Sharratt, were at Camp Pendleton when the charges were announced. In an e-mailed statement, Theresa Sharratt said she believes the Marine Corps has let her son down.

"Justin has given everything to his country and has done nothing to disgrace it," she wrote. "To the Marine Corps I simply say, 'shame on you for abandoning my son who has gallantly served through horrible times.' "

Sgt. Sanick P. Dela Cruz, 24, faces five charges of unpremeditated murder for allegedly killing a group of men who approached the Marine convoy in a white car that morning after the bomb blast. Marines who were on the scene have alleged that Dela Cruz emptied his rifle's clip into the victims' bodies. The Marine Corps alleges that he also lied to investigators after the incident.

Also charged with two counts of unpremeditated murder is Lance Cpl. Stephen B. Tatum, 25, who joined Wuterich as he cleared the Haditha houses. Tatum also faces four counts of negligent homicide -- which carry a maximum punishment of three years in prison -- and one charge of assault.

Charges in such a case are the first step in the military's legal process and will be followed by an Article 32 hearing, which is roughly equivalent to a civilian grand jury investigation. After that hearing, an investigating officer will recommend how to proceed, and commanders will decide whether the cases should go to courts-martial.

The four Marines charged in the slayings face possible sentences of life in prison. The four officers face much lighter sentences.

They are charged with dereliction for failing to report the incident to superiors and failing to initiate an investigation. None of the officers was at the scene when the slayings occurred. A young lieutenant platoon leader who arrived shortly after the shootings is not accused in the case.

Lt. Col. Jeffrey R. Chessani, 42, the Marines' battalion commander, was charged with one count of violating an order, which carries a maximum sentence of two years in prison, and two counts of dereliction, each of which carries a six-month sentence. Capt. Randy W. Stone, 34, the battalion's staff judge advocate, faces similar accusations. Capt. Lucas M. McConnell, 31, the Marines' company commander, is charged with two counts of dereliction. Lt. Andrew A. Grayson, 25, an intelligence officer, faces two dereliction counts, one count of making a false official statement and one count of obstructing justice.

In a statement to investigators, Chessani said he believed that the Marines' actions followed a complex attack meant to draw them into firing on civilian houses. He said he reported to superiors that civilians had been killed.

"I thought it was very sad, very unfortunate, but at the time I did not suspect any wrongdoing from my Marines," Chessani told investigators, according to a transcript. "I saw it as a combat action."

The four officers are the largest number charged in any one civilian homicide case from the Iraq war and bring to 10 the total number of officers charged in connection with homicide cases.

Sixty-four U.S. service members have been charged in connection with the deaths of Iraqi civilians since the war began in March 2003. Eighteen have been sentenced to prison time, including a 90-year term for an Army soldier who admitted his role in raping an Iraqi teenager in Mahmudiyah and killing her and her family.

Geis reported from Camp Pendleton, Calif. Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.

Did American fire on Iraqis for sport? - Lisa Myers & the NBC Investigative Unit - MSNBC.com

 

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Did an American fire on Iraqis unprovoked?
U.S. security contractors allege their supervisor was ‘out of control’


WASHINGTON - Shane Schmidt was a U.S. Marine for seven years, the leader of a sniper unit. Chuck Shepard spent seven years in the U.S. Army. After leaving the military, each found his way into the legions of heavily armed private security contractors working in Iraq.

he two men say they thought he was joking.

They claim the man first fired seven or eight rounds into a white truck positioned about 100 yards behind them.

"He cracked his door," alleges Schmidt, "put a foot out, and fired seven or eight rounds into a parked, white moving truck that was to our rear."

Later on that day, on the next leg of the mission, according to Shepard, the shift leader then said: "I've never shot anybody with my pistol before."

Shepard says the shift leader "immediately turns, opens the door, and fires seven to eight rounds into a taxi cab that we're overtaking, that we're passing."

The men claim the taxi rolled off the road, but that they are not sure if anyone was killed.

"I know that he shot at innocent civilians," says Shepard. "I know that we're trained very well on our marksmanship."

Whistle-blowers fired
But Shepard and Schmidt acknowledge they waited almost two days, by which time their supervisor left Iraq, to report the incidents to their company, Triple Canopy.

The men were fired, along with their supervisor, who has denied wrongdoing, according to the company.

Shepard and Schmidt are now suing Triple Canopy. Their lawsuit alleges they were fired "in retaliation for their reporting criminal activity which they had witnessed."

"I believe we were fired," says Shepard, "because they wanted this whole incident to go away."

The two were working together on July 8, 2006, when they claim they witnessed what they believe was a crime. They say another American fired, unprovoked, into two Iraqi civilian vehicles. They say it started during a mission to Baghdad International Airport, when their supervisor, who was leaving Iraq the next day and was in the vehicle with them, made a troubling remark.

"He'd made a comment that he was going to kill somebody today," says Schmidt. "Kill someone."

Army Suicide Rates in Iraq Rose

 

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Army Suicide Rates in Iraq Rose
By: Nicole Belle @ 6:30 PM - PST Submit or Digg this Post

Military.com:

Army suicide rates in Iraq and Kuwait doubled between 2004 and 2005 but were still below the 2003 rate, officials said Tuesday.

But Armywide, the 2005 saw the highest rate of soldiers taking their own lives since the beginning of the Iraq war, officials said.

Officials spoke about the suicides Tuesday as the Army released a report on the third Mental Health Advisory Team Survey of troops in Iraq. Data for 2006 is not yet available.

In 2005, the number of soldiers in the Iraq theater who killed themselves was 22, double the 2004 figure of 11, but below the 2003 figure of 25, Morales said.

Armywide, the number of reported suicides was 88 in 2005, up from 67 in 2004 and 78 in 2003, said Walter E. Morales, Army suicide prevention manager.

Of the 2005 downrange suicides, five had been deployed more than once, said Dr. (Col.) Edward Crandell, who was in charge of the survey team to Iraq.


But Armywide, the 2005 saw the highest rate of soldiers taking their own lives since the beginning of the Iraq war, officials said.

Officials spoke about the suicides Tuesday as the Army released a report on the third Mental Health Advisory Team Survey of troops in Iraq. Data for 2006 is not yet available.

In 2005, the number of soldiers in the Iraq theater who killed themselves was 22, double the 2004 figure of 11, but below the 2003 figure of 25, Morales said.

Armywide, the number of reported suicides was 88 in 2005, up from 67 in 2004 and 78 in 2003, said Walter E. Morales, Army suicide prevention manager.

Of the 2005 downrange suicides, five had been deployed more than once, said Dr. (Col.) Edward Crandell, who was in charge of the survey team to Iraq."

Rice: Iraq worth investment of American Lives and Dollars

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told The Associated Press on Thursday that Iraq is "worth the investment" in American lives and dollars.

The top U.S. diplomat said the United States can win in Iraq, although the war so far has been longer and more difficult than she had expected. She made the remarks at a time when President Bush is under pressure from the public and members of Congress to find a fresh course in the long-running and costly war, which has shown no signs of nearing an end and cost the lives of more than 2,950 American troops.

In the AP interview, Rice was asked whether an additional $100 billion the Pentagon wants for the Iraq and Afghan wars might amount to throwing good money after bad in Iraq. The U.S. has already spent more than $350 billion on the conflict.

"I don't think it's a matter of money," Rice said. "Along the way there have been plenty of markers that show that this is a country that is worth the investment, because once it emerges as a country that is a stabilizing factor you will have a very different kind of Middle East."

The Rise and Fall of Chalabi: Bush's Mr. Wrong - Newsweek: World News - MSNBC.com

 

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Newsweek

Chalabi is an expert manipulator who knows how to work the press as well as congressmen, lobbyists and think-tankers. He began coming up with Iraqi defectors who told reporters stories of Saddam's allying with terrorists and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. After lurid stories appeared in the press (and softened up bureaucratic skepticism in the government), Chalabi would pass on the defectors to American intelligence agencies. Thus, in December 2001, Chalabi produced a defector who told The New York Times that he had seen biological- and nuclear-weapons labs hidden around Baghdad, including one underneath a hospital. The defector later became a source for the Defense Intelligence Agency. To Vanity Fair, Chalabi peddled another defector, a supposed former general in the Iraqi secret police, who told of terrorists-in-training practicing to hijack passenger aircraft at a secret base near Baghdad. (The defector, Abu Zeinab, was dismissed by the CIA as a "bullsh----er," according to an intelligence source; newly coached by the INC, he went back to the CIA and was again rejected.)
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When American spooks proved resistant, Chalabi cozied up to their counterparts in foreign intelligence services. To the Germans, Chalabi provided a source code named "Curveball" (appropriately, as it turned out), who told of Saddam's building mobile bioweapons labs. Another defector sent to the DIA by Chalabi supported Curveball's tale. DIA labeled this defector a "fabricator" and attached a warning notice to his report, but the notice was so highly restricted that other intelligence officials never saw it. Both defectors' reports—apparently pure fiction—worked their way into official pronouncements and became part of the Bush administration's building case for war. Months later, when Colin Powell was feeling burned for having dramatically presented "facts" to the United Nations Security Council that turned out to be shaky at best, the secretary of State privately, but bitterly, blamed Chalabi.

Powell also faults the neocons in the Bush administration who swallowed Chalabi's phony stories and pushed them into speeches by the president and vice president. With his clever sense for bureaucratic gamesmanship, Chalabi fed the neocons' hunger for raw intelligence. If the CIA and other spy services weren't going to come up with the goods on Saddam, then Chalabi would. He found a receptive audience in the office of the vice president and at the Pentagon. I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, the veep's chief of staff, and Wolfowitz were eagerly looking for links between Saddam and Al Qaeda. With his media friends, Chalabi hyped a story, often cited by the neocons, about a secret meeting in Prague between Muhammad Atta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers, and a high-level Iraqi intelligence officer. (After months of investigation, the CIA and FBI determined that the meeting had never taken place.)


Much of Chalabi's dubious intelligence was funneled to the DIA through top Pentagon civilians. Under Secretary Feith himself signed a long and detailed summary of the intelligence linking Saddam to terrorists and WMD. The Feith memo, stamped secret, submitted to Congress and leaked to the conservative Weekly Standard magazine last summer, reads like a conspiracy theorist's greatest hits. Interviewed last week by NEWSWEEK, Feith was a little defensive about his relationship with Chalabi. "The press stories would have him as my brother. I met him a few times. He was very smart, very articulate," Feith said. Feith allowed he has always been drawn to the stories of exiles who come back to save their countries. But he rejected the idea that he had been Chalabi's tool or dupe.

Over at the State Department and CIA, career bureaucrats viewed Chalabi with a jaundiced eye. State Department auditors found that Chalabi had not always kept the most meticulous records of the funds flowing into the Iraqi National Congress. Diplomats suspected Chalabi was using taxpayers' money to fund his own war-propaganda campaign, which was barred by law. In the summer of 2002, the State Department moved to cut off Chalabi's funding, but he was rescued by his friends at the Pentagon. That fall the Defense Department began picking up the check using secret intelligence funds. All told, Chalabi's INC has been paid about $33 million by State and some $6 million by the DIA. (Not all of Chalabi's intelligence operation was dodgy; last week, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard Myers told Congress that some of the information turned over by the INC had saved the lives of American soldiers.)

With his eye on Saddam's soon-to-be-empty throne, Chalabi took an active interest in planning for postwar Iraq. In retrospect, his involvement was unfortunate. At best, it contributed to government paralysis and fed a standoff between the ever-feuding State and Defense departments. Chalabi's closest ally, Richard Perle, vigorously denied to NEWSWEEK that the neocons wanted to "install" Chalabi as the new head of Iraq. "No one installed by the United States could survive," said Perle. But the neocons did want to help train and equip Iraqi exiles loyal to Chalabi who could be airlifted into Iraq and take over as a security force (or as Chalabi's private army, depending on your point of view).

The State Department stood against this plan. A team of diplomats and Arab experts worked up a 15-volume Future of Iraq project that Defense Department officials dismissed as overly academic and "nonoperational." At Feith's office in the Pentagon, charged with postwar reconstruction, the Future of Iraq documents were consigned to the dustbin. When various Iraqi-exile groups met outside London in the fall of 2002 to try to compromise on a post-Saddam government, the outcome was the mild anarchy of dueling press conferences to announce vague and uncertain plans.

Doomed by bureaucratic infighting and a notable lack of enthusiasm among the community of potential freedom fighters, the plan to build an Iraqi-exile force fizzled. Something like 100 Iraqi men showed up to be trained as soldiers at a camp in Hungary. Nonetheless, Chalabi and his INC entourage were airlifted into southern Iraq by the Pentagon shortly after the American invasion in April 2003.

As soon as Saddam's statue was toppled, Chalabi moved into Baghdad to become, in effect, the new nation's first warlord. He set up office in the Baghdad Hunting Club, a comfortable, vaguely colonial-sounding establishment in a posh neighborhood, and then moved his operation into an edifice with outlandish pagoda-style turrets and vast corridors, known as "the Chinese House." Through associates, he took over the old Finance Ministry and later his clan set up one-stop shopping for foreign companies that wanted to do business in the new Iraq.

Chalabi was not universally endorsed in the upper echelons of the Bush administration. True, when President Bush went to the United Nations last September to proclaim a free Iraq, the man sitting in Iraq's seat at the General Assembly was Ahmad Chalabi. But when Chalabi was first flown into Iraq by the Defense Department, national-security adviser Condoleezza Rice was visibly startled when reporters gave her the news that Chalabi was on the ground and had rounded up a 700-man local army. Even Rumsfeld was less than a totally committed Chalabi partisan. "Why do people keep saying that Chalabi is my candidate?" Rumsfeld would wonder aloud at meetings of the Defense Advisory Board, according to Perle, who was a member. But a quick and sure Chalabi takeover offered Rumsfeld the one thing above all he wanted: a fast way to get American troops out of Iraq. No fan of "nation-building," Rumsfeld wanted a new Iraqi government that could take over and run the place.

Dean: Shocking The Conscience Of America Bush And Cheney Call For The Right To Torture And Are Decisively and Correctly Rebuffed by t

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Friday, Dec. 16, 2005

If the events I am about to describe were taking place in a movie, or novel, I would lose my ability to suspend disbelief: Who could conceive of an American President and Vice President demanding that Congress give them authority to torture anyone, under any circumstances?

Yet that is exactly what happened. Until Congress -- finally -- showed some institutional pride and told Bush and Cheney that it would not tolerate torture.
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To place this activity in context, I have been trying to think of a similar "un-American" low point in the American presidency. Possible candidates might include John Adams's approval of the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, or Abraham Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War.

But neither of these moments strikes me as sufficiently shameful. Indeed, not even Franklin Roosevelt's horrific internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II is, in my view, as low a point as President Bush and Vice President Cheney's call for the unrestricted, unreviewable power to torture. It seems the precedent for Bush and Cheney's thinking resides in the Dark Ages, or Stalin's Russia.

The Bush/Cheney presidency has been pushing the nation toward an atrocity unmatched in the annals of American infamy and ignominy. Thankfully, a few wiser men and women in Washington have saved us from the national disgrace Bush and Cheney insisted upon imposing on the nation.

If you have not been following this shameful saga, here is a brief recounting of the key events. A sensible resolution appears to be at hand.

McCain's Torture Amendments

In October and November of 2005, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) offered amendments to the Defense Department's authorization bill and its appropriations bill. Apparently, McCain sought to avoid having his amendments defeated based upon a parliamentary technicality. And he succeeded, attaching the amendments to both pieces of legislation.

The first McCain-sponsored amendment is titled "Uniform Standards for the Interrogation of Persons Under the Detention of the Department of Defense." It simply states that persons "in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense" can only be interrogated pursuant to the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation. (The new edition is about to be released; let us hope it does not contain unwelcome surprises for Senator McCain, and that the Army has proceeded, here, in good faith, rather than trying to undermine the Senator's legislation.)

The second McCain-sponsored amendment is titled "Prohibition On Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of Person Under Custody or Control of the United States Government." This provision requires individuals in the custody of, or under the physical control of, the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, not be subjected "to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment."

When officials in the White House leaned of these amendments, they tried to block them. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist tried, but failed, to procedurally prevent Senator McCain from offering the amendments. Then the White House threatened that President Bush, who has not vetoed a single piece of legislation since assuming office, would veto any legislation that contained McCain's amendments, even if it meant shutting off funds for the Department of Defense (a move that would have posed no small threat to national security).

Senator McCain, joined by former military judge and current Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), called the bluff of the White House, and pushed forward. The U.S. Senate voted 90 to 9 in favor of McCain's amendments. (Senator Corzine (D-NJ), who was running for governor, was absent). The nine Senators who, with their votes, refused to prohibit torture deserve mention, for notwithstanding mealy rationalizations, their votes should haunt their political careers: Senators Allard (R-CL), Bond (R-MO), Coburn (R-OK), Cochran (R-MS), Cornyn (R-TX), Inhofe (R-OK), Roberts (R-KS), Sessions (R-AL), and Stevens (R-AK).

The Reasons For, and Importance of, The McCain Amendments

Bush has repeatedly said, "We do not torture." Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has repeatedly claimed the United States does not engage in "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment." And CIA director Porter Goss says his agency "does not do torture. Torture does not work."

Why, then, was it necessary to clarify the law? Because no one believes the Bush Administration on this issue. Recall the torture memos, in which the White House was defining away torture. As The Economist commented, the words of these officials count "for little when the administration has argued, first, that during time of war, the president can make just about anything legal, and, second, that the UN Convention Against Torture does not apply to interrogations of foreign terrorist suspects outside the United States."

Senator McCain's agenda has been clear. His first amendment is based on the military's experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq: As he explained, "We placed extraordinary pressure of [American troops] to extract intelligence from detainees, but then threw out the rules that our soldiers had trained on and replaced them with a confusing and constantly changing array of standards. We demanded intelligence without ever clearly telling our troops what was permitted and what was forbidden. And when things went wrong, we blamed them, and we punished them. I believe we have to do better than that."

McCain's second amendment offers nothing new - yet is, paradoxically, extremely important nonetheless. The amendment restates what is, in fact, the law under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United States in 1948; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a signatory; and the Convention Against Torture, negotiated by the Reagan Administration.

When ratifying the Convention Against Torture, the Senate imposed a reservation: that the implementing laws should define "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment" as prohibited by the U.S. Constitution's Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court has held that such treatment must "shock the conscience" to be beyond the pale. Strikes me that Bush and Cheney have shocked America's conscience.

In addition, in 2004, Congress passed a bipartisan amendment to the Defense Authorization bill, reaffirming that detainees in U.S. custody could not be subject to torture or cruel treatment as those terms have been previously defined by the U.S. Government. "But since last year's DOD bill," Senator McCain informed his colleagues, "a strange legal determination was made that the prohibition in the Convention Against Torture against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment does not legally apply to foreigners held outside the United States." Or as the Senator put it more bluntly, "They can apparently be treated inhumanely."

The Bush/Cheney Administration's reading of the law is malarkey. Judge Abe Sofaer, who negotiated the torture convention, wrote an OpEd explaining that there was never any intention to limit the torture convention to American soil. And this is another reason why McCain's amendments are needed: The Washington Post's report of an international network of CIA-run secret prisons raises the fear that the U.S. may, based on this distortion of the law, be torturing its prisoners whenever it finds it expedient to do so.

Common sense tells the world if Bush and Cheney did not want to engage in torture, they would not have been pulling out all the stops to block these amendments.

Stated Reasons For Opposition To McCain's Amendments

The Administration's public explanation for its opposition to McCain's amendments, as made by those willing to carry sewage for them, bordered on pathetic. Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) claimed during the Senate debate on the amendments that they would have a reverse impact, resulting in more torture.

Stevens reached this conclusion by claiming that the international teams that pursue terrorists, being aware of restrictions on Americans, would not give the United States custody of terrorists that they found. This contention is so full of holes that it is barely necessary to refute it.

Not all groups that sniff out terrorists are international. To the contrary, that is the exception to the rule. And typically, Americans command these undertakings, so the idea that prisoners accused of terrorism would be somehow taken away from America and tortured - against America's will -- by other nations is absurd.

In fact, the current practice is exactly the opposite: Through what is called "rendition," America now allows its own suspects to be turned over to countries that torture more shamelessly, and that do not honor the kind of rights the U.S. Constitution guarantees.

McCain's second amendment, by prohibiting torture of anyone, anywhere, who "in the custody of, or under the physical control of, the United States Government" ought to preclude rendition - and surely is intended to do so. (But clever lawyers may try to evade it with sophistry: If the U.S. truly transfers custody of a prisoner to another sovereign, is he still under the U.S.'s physical control? What if another country captures a U.S. suspect, and tortures him before turning him over?)

Reports indicated that Dick Cheney's favorite argument - the one he makes in trip after trip to closed door meetings on Capitol Hill to get authority, at minimum, for the CIA to be able to torture -- is the old "ticking bomb" argument. So frequently has this specious argument been employed to justify torture, it deserves to be shot down with more than a passing reference.

The "Ticking Bomb" Argument For Torture

The argument goes like this: A nuclear bomb has been planted in the heart of a major American city, and authorities have in custody a person who knows where it is located. To save possibly millions of lives, would it not be justified to torture this individual to get the information? Is not this lesser evil justified?

Of course it is. And this argument is a wonderful means to comfort those who have moral problems with torture. The beauty of this argument is that once you concede there are circumstances were torture might be justified, morally and legally (through what criminal law calls the defense of necessity: that an act is justified to save lives), you are on the other side of the line. You've joined the torture crowd.

Those who've invoked the argument range from Alan Dershowitz, to the Israeli Supreme Court, to the Schlesinger Report on Abu Ghraib, to the Robb/Silberman Pre-Iraq War Intelligence Report.

Most recently, and eloquently, the argument was set forth in the pages of The Weekly Standard, by Charles Krauthammer. His powerful essay, "The Truth about Torture: It's time to be honest about doing terrible things," received wide circulation on the internet.

With all these great minds, and moral authorities, relying on this argument, it is with some trepidation that I point out that it is phony. I do so for a number of very real reasons.

Fallacies In The "Ticking Bomb" Argument -- The Clock Does Not Work

It is a rhetorical device. It is seductively simplistic, and compellingly logical. It is also pure fantasy. The conditions of ticking bomb scenarios are seldom real.

No one has more effectively probed the fallacies of this argument than Georgetown University School of Law professor David Luban. Writing in the Washington Post, in a piece entitled "Torture, American-Style," Luban explains why, while it makes good television melodrama, this scenario does not produce critical thinking.

Professor Luban surgically dissects this argument at greater length in the October 2005 Virginia Law Review. His essay "Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb" is very much worth the read. Citing moral philosopher Bernard Williams, Luban writes that "there are certain situations so monstrous that the idea that the processes of moral rationality could yield an answer in them is insane," and "to spend time thinking what one would decide if one were in such a situation is also insane, if not merely frivolous."

Indeed, shouldn't the President, the Vice President, and those members of the Senate and House embracing the power to torture without justification, without court oversight, and without limits, look, instead, at what they are doing to us as a society? As professor Luban notes, "McCain has said that ultimately the debate is over who we are. We will never figure that out until we stop talking about ticking bombs, and stop playing games with words."

Which brings us to the present situation.

Resolution Of The McCain Amendments

The House of Representatives, as far as the Republican leadership was concerned, was not willing to accept the McCain Amendments. No surprise there. Last year, Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert tried to slip a provision into a law authorizing the CIA to torture. But he got caught, and the effort died.

The House GOP leaders wanted to avoid letting this matter come to a recorded vote in the House. How many members would dare to vote for torture? Even though public opinion polls are all over the lot, as Maggie Gallagher found, when Gallup asked more specific questions, Americans recoiled.

For example, Gallup asked, "Would you be willing, or not willing, to have the U.S. Government torture known terrorists if they know details about future terrorist attacks in the U.S.?" Fifty-nine percent were not willing.

The poll asked if the following activities were right or wrong: forcing prisoners to remain naked and chained in uncomfortable positions in cold rooms for several hours: (79 percent said this was wrong); having female interrogator make physical contact with Muslim men during religious observances that prohibit such contact (85 percent said this was wrong); threatening to transfer a prisoner to a country known to use torture: (62 percent said this was wrong); threatening prisoners with dogs (69 percent said this was wrong); using the technique of waterboarding, which simulates drowning (82 percent said this was wrong). The only 50/50 split came on sleep deprivation.

Senator McCain has been in negotiations with the House, and with the White House. Then Congressman John P. Murtha (D-Pa.) forced the issue in the House, calling for a motion to instruct the House conferee to accept the language of the McCain Amendments. "No circumstance whatsoever justifies torture. No emergencies, no state of war, no level of political instability," Murtha, a heavily decorated and much respected veteran, said.

Only one lonely voice dared to speak on the House floor against this motion. Congressman C.W. Bill Young of Florida opposed the McCain amendments because he did not believe terrorists should have the protection of our Constitution. The argument was absurd. They already have that protection, and McCain's amendments do not change the existing law. Young's contention went nowhere. The vote sent a clear message to Bush and Cheney. The motion carried by 308 yeas and 122 nays. Those are 122 members of the House who have shamed themselves.

The Congress has given the Bush/Cheney White House no choice: Back down. Both the Senate and the House have told the President, if you veto, we will cram this down your throat. As Mr. Murtha put it: "No torture and no exceptions."

Since Dick Cheney is so keen on torture, maybe he will give the nation a demonstration of waterboarding, which he does not seem to believe is cruel, inhumane, or degrading. No doubt he could be given a ticking clock to keep with him under water as well.

What Do You Think? Message Boards

John W. Dean, a FindLaw columnist, is a former counsel to the president.



The second McCain-sponsored amendment is titled "Prohibition On Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of Person Under Custody or Control of the United States Government." This provision requires individuals in the custody of, or under the physical control of, the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, not be subjected "to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment."

When officials in the White House leaned of these amendments, they tried to block them. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist tried, but failed, to procedurally prevent Senator McCain from offering the amendments. Then the White House threatened that President Bush, who has not vetoed a single piece of legislation since assuming office, would veto any legislation that contained McCain's amendments, even if it meant shutting off funds for the Department of Defense (a move that would have posed no small threat to national security).

Senator McCain, joined by former military judge and current Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), called the bluff of the White House, and pushed forward. The U.S. Senate voted 90 to 9 in favor of McCain's amendments. (Senator Corzine (D-NJ), who was running for governor, was absent). The nine Senators who, with their votes, refused to prohibit torture deserve mention, for notwithstanding mealy rationalizations, their votes should haunt their political careers: Senators Allard (R-CL), Bond (R-MO), Coburn (R-OK), Cochran (R-MS), Cornyn (R-TX), Inhofe (R-OK), Roberts (R-KS), Sessions (R-AL), and Stevens (R-AK).

The Reasons For, and Importance of, The McCain Amendments

Bush has repeatedly said, "We do not torture." Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has repeatedly claimed the United States does not engage in "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment." And CIA director Porter Goss says his agency "does not do torture. Torture does not work."

Why, then, was it necessary to clarify the law? Because no one believes the Bush Administration on this issue. Recall the torture memos, in which the White House was defining away torture. As The Economist commented, the words of these officials count "for little when the administration has argued, first, that during time of war, the president can make just about anything legal, and, second, that the UN Convention Against Torture does not apply to interrogations of foreign terrorist suspects outside the United States."

Senator McCain's agenda has been clear. His first amendment is based on the military's experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq: As he explained, "We placed extraordinary pressure of [American troops] to extract intelligence from detainees, but then threw out the rules that our soldiers had trained on and replaced them with a confusing and constantly changing array of standards. We demanded intelligence without ever clearly telling our troops what was permitted and what was forbidden. And when things went wrong, we blamed them, and we punished them. I believe we have to do better than that."

McCain's second amendment offers nothing new - yet is, paradoxically, extremely important nonetheless. The amendment restates what is, in fact, the law under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United States in 1948; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a signatory; and the Convention Against Torture, negotiated by the Reagan Administration.

When ratifying the Convention Against Torture, the Senate imposed a reservation: that the implementing laws should define "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment" as prohibited by the U.S. Constitution's Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court has held that such treatment must "shock the conscience" to be beyond the pale. Strikes me that Bush and Cheney have shocked America's conscience.

In addition, in 2004, Congress passed a bipartisan amendment to the Defense Authorization bill, reaffirming that detainees in U.S. custody could not be subject to torture or cruel treatment as those terms have been previously defined by the U.S. Government. "But since last year's DOD bill," Senator McCain informed his colleagues, "a strange legal determination was made that the prohibition in the Convention Against Torture against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment does not legally apply to foreigners held outside the United States." Or as the Senator put it more bluntly, "They can apparently be treated inhumanely."

The Bush/Cheney Administration's reading of the law is malarkey. Judge Abe Sofaer, who negotiated the torture convention, wrote an OpEd explaining that there was never any intention to limit the torture convention to American soil. And this is another reason why McCain's amendments are needed: The Washington Post's report of an international network of CIA-run secret prisons raises the fear that the U.S. may, based on this distortion of the law, be torturing its prisoners whenever it finds it expedient to do so.

Common sense tells the world if Bush and Cheney did not want to engage in torture, they would not have been pulling out all the stops to block these amendments.

Stated Reasons For Opposition To McCain's Amendments

The Administration's public explanation for its opposition to McCain's amendments, as made by those willing to carry sewage for them, bordered on pathetic. Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) claimed during the Senate debate on the amendments that they would have a reverse impact, resulting in more torture.

Stevens reached this conclusion by claiming that the international teams that pursue terrorists, being aware of restrictions on Americans, would not give the United States custody of terrorists that they found. This contention is so full of holes that it is barely necessary to refute it.

Not all groups that sniff out terrorists are international. To the contrary, that is the exception to the rule. And typically, Americans command these undertakings, so the idea that prisoners accused of terrorism would be somehow taken away from America and tortured - against America's will -- by other nations is absurd.

In fact, the current practice is exactly the opposite: Through what is called "rendition," America now allows its own suspects to be turned over to countries that torture more shamelessly, and that do not honor the kind of rights the U.S. Constitution guarantees.

McCain's second amendment, by prohibiting torture of anyone, anywhere, who "in the custody of, or under the physical control of, the United States Government" ought to preclude rendition - and surely is intended to do so. (But clever lawyers may try to evade it with sophistry: If the U.S. truly transfers custody of a prisoner to another sovereign, is he still under the U.S.'s physical control? What if another country captures a U.S. suspect, and tortures him before turning him over?)

Reports indicated that Dick Cheney's favorite argument - the one he makes in trip after trip to closed door meetings on Capitol Hill to get authority, at minimum, for the CIA to be able to torture -- is the old "ticking bomb" argument. So frequently has this specious argument been employed to justify torture, it deserves to be shot down with more than a passing reference.

The "Ticking Bomb" Argument For Torture

The argument goes like this: A nuclear bomb has been planted in the heart of a major American city, and authorities have in custody a person who knows where it is located. To save possibly millions of lives, would it not be justified to torture this individual to get the information? Is not this lesser evil justified?

Of course it is. And this argument is a wonderful means to comfort those who have moral problems with torture. The beauty of this argument is that once you concede there are circumstances were torture might be justified, morally and legally (through what criminal law calls the defense of necessity: that an act is justified to save lives), you are on the other side of the line. You've joined the torture crowd.

Those who've invoked the argument range from Alan Dershowitz, to the Israeli Supreme Court, to the Schlesinger Report on Abu Ghraib, to the Robb/Silberman Pre-Iraq War Intelligence Report.

Most recently, and eloquently, the argument was set forth in the pages of The Weekly Standard, by Charles Krauthammer. His powerful essay, "The Truth about Torture: It's time to be honest about doing terrible things," received wide circulation on the internet.

With all these great minds, and moral authorities, relying on this argument, it is with some trepidation that I point out that it is phony. I do so for a number of very real reasons.

Fallacies In The "Ticking Bomb" Argument -- The Clock Does Not Work

It is a rhetorical device. It is seductively simplistic, and compellingly logical. It is also pure fantasy. The conditions of ticking bomb scenarios are seldom real.

No one has more effectively probed the fallacies of this argument than Georgetown University School of Law professor David Luban. Writing in the Washington Post, in a piece entitled "Torture, American-Style," Luban explains why, while it makes good television melodrama, this scenario does not produce critical thinking.

Professor Luban surgically dissects this argument at greater length in the October 2005 Virginia Law Review. His essay "Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb" is very much worth the read. Citing moral philosopher Bernard Williams, Luban writes that "there are certain situations so monstrous that the idea that the processes of moral rationality could yield an answer in them is insane," and "to spend time thinking what one would decide if one were in such a situation is also insane, if not merely frivolous."

Indeed, shouldn't the President, the Vice President, and those members of the Senate and House embracing the power to torture without justification, without court oversight, and without limits, look, instead, at what they are doing to us as a society? As professor Luban notes, "McCain has said that ultimately the debate is over who we are. We will never figure that out until we stop talking about ticking bombs, and stop playing games with words."

Which brings us to the present situation.

Resolution Of The McCain Amendments

The House of Representatives, as far as the Republican leadership was concerned, was not willing to accept the McCain Amendments. No surprise there. Last year, Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert tried to slip a provision into a law authorizing the CIA to torture. But he got caught, and the effort died.

The House GOP leaders wanted to avoid letting this matter come to a recorded vote in the House. How many members would dare to vote for torture? Even though public opinion polls are all over the lot, as Maggie Gallagher found, when Gallup asked more specific questions, Americans recoiled.

For example, Gallup asked, "Would you be willing, or not willing, to have the U.S. Government torture known terrorists if they know details about future terrorist attacks in the U.S.?" Fifty-nine percent were not willing.

The poll asked if the following activities were right or wrong: forcing prisoners to remain naked and chained in uncomfortable positions in cold rooms for several hours: (79 percent said this was wrong); having female interrogator make physical contact with Muslim men during religious observances that prohibit such contact (85 percent said this was wrong); threatening to transfer a prisoner to a country known to use torture: (62 percent said this was wrong); threatening prisoners with dogs (69 percent said this was wrong); using the technique of waterboarding, which simulates drowning (82 percent said this was wrong). The only 50/50 split came on sleep deprivation.

Senator McCain has been in negotiations with the House, and with the White House. Then Congressman John P. Murtha (D-Pa.) forced the issue in the House, calling for a motion to instruct the House conferee to accept the language of the McCain Amendments. "No circumstance whatsoever justifies torture. No emergencies, no state of war, no level of political instability," Murtha, a heavily decorated and much respected veteran, said.

Only one lonely voice dared to speak on the House floor against this motion. Congressman C.W. Bill Young of Florida opposed the McCain amendments because he did not believe terrorists should have the protection of our Constitution. The argument was absurd. They already have that protection, and McCain's amendments do not change the existing law. Young's contention went nowhere. The vote sent a clear message to Bush and Cheney. The motion carried by 308 yeas and 122 nays. Those are 122 members of the House who have shamed themselves.

The Congress has given the Bush/Cheney White House no choice: Back down. Both the Senate and the House have told the President, if you veto, we will cram this down your throat. As Mr. Murtha put it: "No torture and no exceptions."

Since Dick Cheney is so keen on torture, maybe he will give the nation a demonstration of waterboarding, which he does not seem to believe is cruel, inhumane, or degrading. No doubt he could be given a ticking clock to keep with him under water as well.

Video: O'Neill: Bush determined to invade Iraq from Day One

O'Neill: Bush determined to invade Iraq from Day One. (2004)

Operation Iraqi Freedom

In the beginning of the American attack on the sovrien nation of Iraq.

Rumsfeld on Weapons of Mass (self) Destruction


Evident (2002) Rumsfeld tells us all that he and the Bush Administration had "UNKNOWN" knowledge or "that is to say" NO hard evidence of WMDs in Iraq
__________

Q: Could I follow up, Mr. Secretary, on what you just said, please? In regard to Iraq weapons of mass destruction and terrorists, is there any evidence to indicate that Iraq has attempted to or is willing to supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction? Because there are reports that there is no evidence of a direct link between Baghdad and some of these terrorist organizations.

Rumsfeld: Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.

And so people who have the omniscience that they can say with high certainty that something has not happened or is not being tried, have capabilities that are -- what was the word you used, Pam, earlier?

Q: Free associate? (laughs)

Rumsfeld: Yeah. They can -- (chuckles) -- they can do things I can't do. (laughter)

Q: Excuse me. But is this an unknown unknown?

Rumsfeld: I'm not --

Q: Because you said several unknowns, and I'm just wondering if this is an unknown unknown.

Rumsfeld: I'm not going to say which it is.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if you believe something --

Rumsfeld: Right here. Right here. Right here.

Q: Mr. Secretary, point of clarification --

Rumsfeld: No, this is a promise.

---------
RUMSFELD's poetry "THE UNKNOWN"

The Unknown
As we know,
There are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know
There are known unknowns.
That is to say
We know there are some things
We do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns,
The ones we don't know
We don't know.
_______

Meanwhile and later...
The 2003 invasion of Iraq, code named "Operation Iraqi Freedom" by the BUSH administration, officially began on March 20, 2003. The Bush Administration's stated objective of the invasion was "to disarm Iraq of (unknown) weapons of mass destructions , to end Saddam Hussein's (unknown) support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people (unknown)".

Bush Postpones Iraq Speech

Bush Postpones Iraq Speech
The White House planned on President Bush giving a major speech on the Iraq war before Christmas, but ABC News now says the idea has been shelved until next month.

A reason for the switch could be a wave a new polls that show Americans firmly opposed to the Bush administration's approach to handling the war.

* A Washington Post-ABC News poll shows seven in 10 Americans "disapprove of the way the president is handling the situation in Iraq -- the highest percentage since the March 2003 invasion. Six in 10 say the war was not worth fighting."

* A CBS News poll finds Americans think the war in Iraq "is going badly and getting worse, and think it's time for the U.S. either to change its strategy or start getting out. Forty-three percent say the U.S. should keep fighting, but with new tactics, while 50 percent say the U.S. should begin to end its involvement altogether. Only 4 percent say the U.S. should keep fighting as it is doing now."

* A Gallup Poll finds less than half of Americans "are willing to say that they have a great deal or a fair amount of trust in Bush to recommend the right actions for Iraq."

With the war going so badly, it's little wonder Americans give Bush such low approval ratings. He registers just 31% approval in the CBS News poll, 36% in the Washington Post/ABC poll and 38% in the Gallup poll

Video: Loose Change Part 2

Loose Change Part 2

Video: Loose Change part 1

Loose Change Part 1

Evidence that the U.S. Government Planned & Executed 9/11

Another Well done 9/11 conspiracy film.

Middle East | Baghdad robbers grab $1m in cash

Baghdad robbers grab $1m in cash
The wreckage of a car at the site where a roadside bomb exploded near central Baghdad
One person died in a bomb attack near a university in central Baghdad
Iraqi gunmen disguised as soldiers have stolen $1m (£0.51m, 0.76m euro) in cash en route to Baghdad's central bank.

The 10 men, who were wearing Iraqi army uniforms, ambushed the security vehicle and stole bags of cash.

Four private security guards were kidnapped during the robbery, which happened in the Iraqi capital's busy Sadoun Street.

Elsewhere in Iraq, at least 16 people have been killed in violent incidents, including a pregnant woman.

The woman, who died along with three of her children, was shot dead in a village south of Kirkuk.

Police gave no motive for the attack but said that her husband was a Kurd and a member of the old army, according to Agence France Presse.

University attack

In a separate attack near Baghdad's Mustansiriyah university, a bomb killed a student and wounded at least seven others.

The US military said that four US soldiers had been killed by roadside bombs late on Sunday, bringing the number of troop deaths to more than 40 so far this month.

In other incidents:

# In the town of Dujail, north of Baghdad, gunmen kidnapped five primary school teachers on their way to work by minibus

# In southern Baghdad, four people were killed when four mortar rounds hit the Abu Chi neighbourhood

# In the capital's southern Dura district, a suicide bomber exploded his vehicle near a police commando base, killing one policeman and wounding five others

# A roadside bomb blasted the capital's Palestine Street, in the west of the city, killing one and wounding six.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: Iraq worse than a civil war

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in a tough candid interview said
Despite what the official US stand is,"The situation in Iraq is much worse than a civil war."




Kofi Annan interview: Text
The BBC's Lyse Doucet interviews Kofi Annan in New York
Kofi Annan was interviewed by the BBC for the last time

The outgoing UN secretary general Kofi Annan gave his last BBC interview to Lyse Doucet. He is due to step down on 31 December when he will be succeeded by South Korea's foreign minister Ban Ki-moon. Below is an excerpt from the interview:

BBC: Was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, without a Security Council resolution, the most difficult point for you in your term?

Kofi Annan: It was extremely difficult, because I really believed that we could have stopped the war and that if we had worked a bit harder - given the inspectors a bit more time - we could have.

I was also concerned that for the US and its coalition to go to war without the consent of the Council in that particular region, which has always been extremely controversial, would be extremely difficult and very divisive and that it would take quite a long time to put the organization back together, and of course it divided the world too.

It is healing but we are not there yet. It hasn't healed yet and we feel the tension still in this organization as a result of that.

BBC: And you watch with mounting alarm, like many people, what's happening. In September, you said Iraq was in danger of sliding towards civil war.

BBC: Is it civil war?

Kofi Annan: It is an extremely dangerous situation and I think we all are interested in getting Iraq right and we would want to get it right, but the Iraqis will have to come together and make it happen. Obviously, they are going to need help, given the killings and the bitterness I'm not sure they can do it alone.

They would need help from the international community and their neighbours, but some of the key things they have to do is the constitutional review, really, looking at issues of revenue sharing, oil and taxation revenues, how do you share it fairly amongst the three groups, or four groups? How do you share power?

I mean, all the struggle is about each group's position in future Iraq, and if you don't deal with those issues, which during the constitution were swept under the rug, they are going to face very serious problems and I think they should be tackled.

BBC: Is it civil war?

Kofi Annan: I think, given the level of violence, the level of killing and bitterness and the way that forces are arranged against each other. A few years ago, when we had the strife in Lebanon and other places, we called that a civil war. This is much worse.

BBC: You must in some way feel sadly vindicated - in 2003, in March, you said that: "A war can lead to unintended consequences, producing new threats and new dangers."

It is sad - it is sad in the sense that it had to come to this.

BBC: Was it a mistake? Some Iraqis say that life is worse than it was under a dictator.

Kofi Annan: I think they are right in the sense of the average Iraqi's life. If I were an average Iraqi obviously I would make the same comparison, that they had a dictator who was brutal but they had their streets, they could go out, their kids could go to school and come back home without a mother or father worrying, "Am I going to see my child again?" And the Iraqi government has not been able to bring the violence under control.

The society needs security and a secure environment for it to get on - without security not much can be done - not recovery or reconstruction.

BBC: Do you believe that the Iraq Study Group led by James Baker and Lee Hamilton which is about to publish its report is a recognition that the US and others have to change course urgently?

Kofi Annan: Yeah, I think it's a recognition that things are not working the way they had hoped and that it is essential to take a critical review - take a critical look at what is going on and, if necessary, change course.

BBC: Because there's no denying the risks at stake here - you met Middle East leaders this summer, they said to you that the whole region had been radicalized and destabilized. In fact, they said it was a disaster.

Kofi Annan: This is the feeling of the leaders in the region and in the streets as well.

The people are worried - they are worried about the future, they are worried about the broader Middle East, they are worried about the tensions with Iran, they are worried about Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and some would even stretch it as far as to Afghanistan.

So we have a very worrisome situation in the broader Middle East and we also need to look at them as a whole, not as individual conflicts. There are linkages between these crises.

BBC: But when you see this unfolding, in the dark of night, do you ever think: "I, as the secretary general, could have done more to stop it, personally"?

Kofi Annan: You mean the war or the situation?

BBC: The war.

Kofi Annan: I think as secretary general I did everything I could. I worked with the member states, and you've read some of the comments I made before the war.

BBC: But you made many comments, for example, you waited until 2004 in a BBC interview to say the war was "illegal".

Kofi Annan: No.

BBC: Why didn't you stand up in the UN Security Council and say in 2003: "This war is illegal without a Security Council resolution"?

Kofi Annan: I think, if you go back to the records, you will discover that before the war I said that for the US and its allies to go to war without Security Council approval would not be in conformity with the Charter.

BBC: Which is a very sort of UN bureaucratic thing, rather than saying "it's illegal" which would have much more impact. And your aides say to me: "This was Kofi Annan, the cautious man, not wanting to confront."

Kofi Annan: It's easy to - what do the Americans call it? - "Saturday morning quarter-backing", or "armchair critic". I mean, it was one of those situations where even before a shot had been fired, you had millions in the street and it didn't make a difference.

BBC: But for you, in that position, a very difficult, devastating time. Your aides say that you lost your voice.

Kofi Annan: Yeah, it was very difficult, very painful, because I really, really felt we should have tried harder to avoid it and I was very worried about the consequences and the results.

BBC: Your biggest regret?

Kofi Annan: My biggest regret - well, it's also linked to Iraq. It was 23 wonderful colleagues and friends I sent to Iraq who got blown away. They went to Iraq to try and help clean up in the aftermath of a war I genuinely did not believe in, and these people, who were wonderful professionals, wonderful friends, were blown up overnight. And of course when that happens, you ask questions, you know: Would they be here if there hadn't been this situation? Would they be here if I hadn't asked them to go?

Bill Clinton's Anti-Terror Efforts

Bill Clinton's Anti-Terror Efforts
02:28
Rather than be ashamed of my voice, I've decided to let it out and talk about things that matter to me. Today I discuss Bill Clinton's efforts against terror during his term. Here is the Transcript of my speech. All of my sources are listed Rather than be ashamed of my voice, I've decided to let it out and talk about things that matter to me. Today I discuss Bill Clinton's efforts against terror during his term. Here is the Transcript of my speech. All of my sources are listed at the bottom. Please visit them. Thank You.

Hello, I am going to talk about Former President Clinton and his anti-terrorism efforts from 1993--2001. Clinton tried to fight the growing presence of Al-Queda and Osama Bin Laden, almost to the point of obsession.

However, he received great opposition from Republicans in Congress and The Pro-Republican Media. Because of the scandle he endured with Monica Lewinsky, many people forget that he did quite a bit of good during his Administration.

Of course, almost all of his efforts were destroyed by Right-Wing Politicians.

During his term, Clinton sent legislation to Congress to TIGHTEN AIRPORT SECURITY. The legislation was defeated by the Republicans because of opposition from the airlines.

Clinton sent legislation to Congress to allow for BETTER TRACKING OF TERRORIST FUNDING. It was defeated by Republicans in the Senate because of opposition from banking interests.

Clinton sent legislation to Congress to add tagents to explosives, to allow for BETTER TRACKING OF EXPLOSIVES. It was defeated by the Republicans because of opposition from the NRA.

Here are some things, however, that DID occur during Clinton's term.

He developed the nation's first anti-terrorism policy

He brought perpetrators of the first World Trade Center bombing and CIA killings to justice.

He attempted to kill Osama bin Laden and disrupt Al Qaeda through preemptive strikes

He tripled the budget of the FBI for counterterrorism and doubled overall funding for counterterrorism.

He also intercepted several planned attacks on the U.S. and stopped cold several acts of possible terrorism including;

The planned attack to blow up 12 U.S. jetliners simultaneously.

The planned attack to blow up UN Headquarters.

The planned attack to blow up the Israeli Embassy in Washington.

The planned attack to blow up Boston airport.

The planned attack to blow up the US Embassy in Albania.

All of these plans were defeated by The Clinton Admininstration, and several more.


In August 1998, President Clinton ordered missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan in an effort to hit Osama bin Laden, who had been linked to the embassy bombings in Africa (and was later connected to the attack on the USS Cole and 9/11). However, The missiles reportedly missed bin Laden by a few hours

Bill Clinton was aggresive in his campaign against Terrorism, and tried his best to protect America by tracking and investigating Al-Queada threats.

In Congress, however, Clinton was rejected by the Conservative Right, and his 1996 Omnibus Terror Bill, which included many of the Anti-Terror measures we now take for granted after 9/11, was defeated to the point of uselessness from attacks from the Right.

In conclusion, take a moment to look at the links I have provided, and think about the many good efforts put forth by Former President Bill Clinton. Good-Bye.


Read About Bill Clinton's Anti-Terrorism Policy Here (Pre 9/11)
http://www.fff.org/freedom/1196b.asp

Information about Clinton's Omnibus Policy
http://www.neusysinc.com/columnarchive/colm0018.html
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/McCarthyism/BringingBack_M cCarthyism.html

Information about the fictional ABC Documentary "Path to 9/11"

http://journals.democraticunderground.com/Fridays%20Child/77

My Other Sources
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Clinton
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/083006J.shtml
http://www.mikehersh.com/Clinton_vs_Terror_Republicans_vs_Cl inton.shtml

ELIOT COHEN blast Iraq Study Group

No Way to Win a War
Iraq Study Group: A fatuous process yielded fatuous results.

BY ELIOT A. COHEN
Sunday, December 10, 2006 12:01 a.m. EST
Published in Wall Street Journal
Link: http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110009364

The theory of the thing is very peculiar indeed. You are in the middle of a war--a hard war, a war that is going badly. If the government has bogged down, if the people inside have gone stale, you would say that the sound thing, the Churchillian or Lincolnian or Rooseveltian thing, would be, first, to fire a bunch of officials (generals as well as top civilians), promote or bring in fresh talent, and put together a small group of people to take a new and unillusioned look. Those people would report back in secrecy to the president and his most senior advisers and aides.

They would consist of experienced soldiers and civilians in whom the president (who, after all, has to make the strategic decisions, and is the accountable executive) has trust. There would not be many of them, a half dozen or so, and they would have to be hardy enough to visit the war zone for several weeks, talking not just to politicians and generals but to captains and sergeants. They would go see things for themselves. They would visit a forward operating base near Tikrit; they would spend some time with Iraqi soldiers in Taji; they would take their chances in a convoy to al Asad, or even a patrol in Tal Afar.

They--not their staff of a few soldiers and secretaries--would do the probing, digging, thinking, discussing and, above all, the writing. The chairman of the group would insist that they air their disagreements candidly and thoroughly in front of the president, engaging in a debate that might last a day, perhaps longer. The rest of us would not find out about the panel until months, or even years, after it reported back; maybe not until the war was over.

The administration's congressional critics (including those of its own party) came up with a different solution: the Iraq Study Group (ISG), which has now produced a document that consists of 50 pages of recommendations, preceded by a 40-page thumbnail sketch of the current situation in Iraq and 50 pages of maps, lists of people, and full-length biographies of the commissioners. This is a group composed, for the most part, of retired eminent public officials, most with limited or no expertise in the waging or study of war. It consists of individuals carefully selected with an eye to diverse partisan and other irrelevant personal characteristics. These worthies, with not one chairman but two (for balance, of course), turned to several score experts known to disagree vehemently with one another about the best course of action to be pursued in Iraq.

Some of the commission members and their advisers cordially detest the president and his administration and opposed him and his war from the outset; others were equally passionate in their defense of both the man and the conflict. And yet this diverse group had an overwhelming mandate, from the beginning, to produce a consensus document. The commission members spent four days in Iraq, and with the exception of a one-day foray by former Marine Chuck Robb, they stayed in the Green Zone, that bubble of palaces and residences that has little to do with the real Iraq of Basra, Kirkuk, Ramadi, Baquba and Mosul. At the end, they had breakfast with the president and a few hours later posted their conclusions on the Internet for all the world to ponder. There is something of farce in all this, an invocation of wisdom from a cohesive Washington elite that does not exist, a desperate wish to believe in the gravitas and the statecraft of grave men (and women) who can sort out the mess in which the country finds itself.

A fatuous process yields, necessarily, fatuous results. "Iraq's neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability"--a statement only somewhat ameliorated by the admission that some are even "undercutting stability," which sounds as though Syria and Iran were being downright rude, rather than providing indispensable assistance to those who have filled the burn wards of Walter Reed, the morgue in Baghdad, and the cemetery at Arlington. The selected remedy is, first and foremost, rather like the ISG's credo for its own functioning, consensus. "The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region," as if our chief failure with Bashar Assad or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lies with the hitherto unnoticed laziness or rhetorical ineptitude of our diplomats, or as though Europe, Saudi Arabia and Israel have not yet figured out that stability in Iraq is a good thing. "Syria should control its border" and "Iran should respect Iraq's sovereignty."

No kidding--but who is going to make them? That perennial solution, "resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict," makes its appearance, including direct negotiations between Israel and Palestinians, but only with "those who accept Israel's right to exist." The report conveniently forgets that the elected leaders of Palestine do not, in fact, accept Israel's right to exist. And it also neglects the grim reality that one of the most terrible things about Gaza, and possibly the West Bank as well, is that no one, not even Hamas, is really in charge.

Part of Iran's price for easing up on us in Iraq is pretty clearly taking the heat off its nuclear program; the ISG recommends that that issue "should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany." Well, what deal should the U.S. be willing to cut on Iranian nuclear weapons? Do we think the Iranians would deliver? And what are the long-term consequences?

War, and warlike statecraft, is a hard business, and though this is supposed to be a report dominated by "realists," there is nothing realistic in failing to spell out the bloody deeds, grim probabilities and dismal consequences associated with even the best course of action. Indeed, some parts of the report read as sheer fantasy--Recommendation 15, for example, which provides that part of the American deal with Syria should include the latter's full cooperation in investigating the Hariri assassination, verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah, and its support for persuading Hamas to recognize Israel.

The prescriptions for internal processes in Iraq are only somewhat better. The ISG argues that American forces should shift to developing Iraqi security forces and backing them up, which is more or less the course we are on now. It talks of milestones for Iraqi performance, as if Iraqi benchmarking were more a problem than Iraqi will, and Iraqi will more the problem than Iraqi capability. It suggests announcing our own planned redeployments without considering the most obvious consequence, which is that Iraqis of many political hues will decide that the Americans are leaving, and the time has come to cut deals with Jaish al Mahdi, or the Badr organization, or al Qaeda in Iraq, or any of the other cutthroat outfits infesting that bleeding country.

Quite apart from the psychological impact of our actions, there is the sober fact that the Iraqi army is small, 138,000-strong (and that number probably overstated), and that building effective security forces takes time. The 188,000-man police forces are corrupt, riddled with militia influence, and in need of a thorough overhaul. We cannot build the Iraqi security forces without a substantial combat presence. Nor is the problem merely one of training, as Iraqi corporals driving around in pickup trucks without functional radios might have sourly pointed out, had they had the chance to talk to a Study Group member.

At least the ISG has given considerable thought to preparing us for future conflict. Consider Recommendations 47 and 48. Congress, they declare, should allocate money to repair the clapped-out equipment the Army and Marines will bring back from Iraq. This is no doubt better than, say, heaving Bradley infantry fighting vehicles overboard on the way back to American ports in order to provide a home for new coral reefs. "As [American] redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize training and education of forces that have returned to the United States in order to restore the force to full combat capability." Pentagon planners would do well to pursue this plan rather than give the troops six months of leave and then having them paint the sorely neglected rocks outside the sergeant major's office.

The great war leaders, in their private deliberations, shied away from vagueness. Haziness about ends and means, about what to do and how to do it, is a mark of strategic ineptitude; in war it gets people killed. But a Churchill could only call the flattening of German cities "terror bombing" in private.

Thus, unsurprisingly, in a public document of this kind, euphemism and imprecision abound. The U.S. needs to give "disincentives" to Syria and Iran: But the real question has always been whether we are willing to use a variety of overt and covert means--from bombing insurgent safe houses to sabotaging refineries, from mining harbors to supporting their own insurgents--to do so. And, in fact, the report mentions no means for squeezing either country.

True, as James Baker irritably noted at the press conference releasing the report, the U.S. talked to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But as the U.S. did so it also bankrupted the U.S.S.R. in an arms race, undermined its client governments in Eastern Europe by supporting Polish labor unions, and killed its soldiers by providing surface-to-air missiles to Afghan guerrillas. Real pain, and not merely tough talk sweetened by a bucket of goodies, paves the way for successful negotiations with brutal opponents.

What we need in Iraq is not a New Diplomatic Offensive (capitals in the original) so much as energy and competence in fighting the fight. From the outset of the Iraq war much of our difficulty has stemmed not so much from failures to find the right strategy, as from an astounding and depressing inability to implement the strategic and operational choices we have nominally made.

This inability has come from things as personal as picking the wrong people for key positions, in the apparent belief that generals are interchangeable cogs in a counterinsurgency machine. It has come from an unwillingness or inability to grab the bureaucracy by the throat and make it act--which is why, three years after the insurgency began, we still send soldiers out to risk roadside bomb attacks in overweight Humvees when there are half a dozen commercially available armored vehicles designed to minimize the effects of such blasts. It is why--although the government has declared long before the ISG issued its report that training the Iraqis is Job One--we still embed fewer than a dozen American advisers in an Iraqi battalion when the right number is three to five times that many.

We have not come up to the brink of failure because we did not know how important it is to employ young Iraqi men or to keep detained insurgents out of circulation or to prevent militia penetration of the security forces by vetting the commanders of those forces. We have known these things--but we have not done these things.

The creation of the Iraq Study Group reflects the vain hope that well-meaning, senior, former public officials can find ideas that have not already occurred to people inside government; that those new ideas can redeem incompetent execution and insufficient resources; that salvation can come from a Washington establishment whose wisdom was exaggerated in its heyday, and which has in any event succumbed to a kind of political-intellectual entropy since the 1960s; that a public commission can do the work of oversight that Congress has shirked for five years in the misguided belief that it would thus support an administration struggling to do its best in a difficult situation. This is no way to run a war, and most definitely, no way to win it.

Mr. Cohen is Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

REPUBLICAN SENATOR GORDON SMITH

CNN'S WOLF BLITZER DOES INTERVIEW WITH REPUBLICAN SENATOR GORDON SMITH WHO ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE SAID THE IRAQ WAR MAY BE ILLEGAL.

This is a man who has studied and reflected on what is happening in Iraq- and has in hiw own words- "come to the end of his rope". The dying US troops really are effecting him. He is not pointing fingers, rather, he accepts responsibility as part of the US Government. "What I say I say not in anger, but in sorrow."

posted by paul grant (follower of Basho)

Military Readiness Lowest Since Vietnam

Salon (watch short ad for a site pass):

Whatever its ultimate fate, the Iraq Study Group report released Wednesday should have destroyed the spurious notion that flooding Iraq with more U.S. troops might win the war. As the report makes clear, a major influx of U.S. combat brigades into Iraq is somewhere between totally unrealistic and completely impossible.

[..]The military is running out of troops and equipment. The cold, hard facts about military readiness and a 1.4 million-strong active-duty force rule out a big increase in the size of the U.S. footprint in Iraq. "We don't have enough is the short answer," said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University [..]Advocating a big increase in troop levels now is just political theater, Hoffman argued. "This is the beginning of the who-lost-Iraq debate," he explained. "No one wants to be a charter member of the club."

Even though the new report articulates a dark picture of U.S. readiness, some politicians, including leading Republican Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, continue to argue that a significant increase in troops in Iraq is needed to save the country from sinking into the abyss. Read on…

Meanwhile, Bush said in his weekly radio address that he is "is confident Americans can move beyond political differences and agree a new direction for Iraq leading to victory." Um, George? The American people HAVE by and large agreed on a new direction for Iraq. It appears YOU are the one who needs to move beyond political differences.

It's too easy to get mired in the political gamesmanship of this inside the Beltway. But I hope that we never let them forget that these are real people whose lives hang in the balance. pment. The cold, hard facts about military readiness and a 1.4 million-strong active-duty force rule out a big increase in the size of the U.S. footprint in Iraq. 'We don't have enough is the short answer,' said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University [..]Advocating a big increase in troop levels now is just political theater, Hoffman argued. 'This is the beginning of the who-lost-Iraq debate,' he explained. 'No one wants to be a charter member of the club.'

Even though the new report articulates a dark picture of U.S. readiness, some politicians, including leading Republican Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, continue to argue that a significant increase in troops in Iraq is needed to save the country from sinking into the abyss. Read on…

Meanwhile, Bush said in his weekly radio address that he is 'is confident Americans can move beyond political differences and agree a new" new direction for Iraq leading to victory." Um, George? The American people HAVE by and large agreed on a new direction for Iraq. It appears YOU are the one who needs to move beyond political differences.

It's too easy to get mired in the political gamesmanship of this inside the Beltway. But I hope that we never let them forget that these are real people whose lives hang in the balance.

The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq: A Retrospective Analysis of the Reconstruction

Brilliant piece of writing


The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq: A Retrospective Analysis of the Reconstruction

Iraq, Middle East, Islamic World

Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Middle East Review of International Affairs

December 01, 2006 —
It never had to be this bad. The reconstruction of Iraq was never going to be quick or easy, but it was not doomed to failure.[1] Its disastrous course to date has been almost entirely the result of a sequence of foolish and unnecessary mistakes on the part of the United States.

Perhaps at some point in the future, revisionist historians will try to claim that the effort was doomed from the start, that it never was possible to build a stable, let alone pluralistic, new Iraq in the rubble of Saddam Hussein's fall. However, that is decidedly not the view of the experts, the journalists covering the story, or the practitioners who went to Iraq to put the country back together after the 2003 invasion. Americans returning from Iraq--military and civilian alike--have proven unanimous in their view that the Iraqis desperately want reconstruction to succeed and that they have the basic tools to make it work, but that the United States has consistently failed to provide them with the opportunities and the framework to succeed.[2] Indeed, perhaps the most tragic evidence of this unrealized potential is that even three-and-a-half years after Saddam's fall, with Iraq mired in a deepening civil war and no sign of real progress on the horizon, over 40 percent of Iraqis still clung to the belief that Iraq was headed in the right direction--with only 35 percent saying it was headed in the wrong direction.[3]

If Iraq does slide into all-out civil war, the Bush Administration will have only itself to blame. It disregarded the advice of experts on Iraq, on nation-building, and on military operations. It staged both the invasion and the reconstruction on the cheap. It never learned from its mistakes and never committed adequate resources to accomplish either its original lofty aspirations or even its later, more modest goals. It refused to believe intelligence that contradicted its own views and doggedly insisted that reality conform to its wishes. In its breathtaking hubris, the Administration engineered a Greek tragedy in Iraq, the outcome of which may plague us for decades.

IGNORANCE AND ARROGANCE

The invasion of Iraq was born of a great many different ideas. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz noted in an interview with Vanity Fair, the threat of Saddam with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was simply the one threat upon which all of the senior members of the Bush Administration agreed--and believed that it could be used to justify the war to the public.[4] Not all of these ideas were foolish. Some of their rationales for war were quite reasonable: the international consensus that Saddam had reconstituted his WMD programs--which turned out to be entirely mistaken but was considered "incontrovertible"[5] at the time;[6] the fact that Saddam was one of the most brutal tyrants of the previous sixty years; the fact that his ambitions ran directly counter to those of the United States--and his efforts to achieve them had destabilized the Persian Gulf for twenty-five years; and the problem that the world was losing interest in keeping him bound by sanctions, as evinced by the postwar revelations of the Volcker commission concerning the corruption and manipulation of the Oil-for-Food program by the Iraqi government to secure the political support of France, Russia, and China, among other countries.[7]

However, there were also a great deal of unreasonable ideas, and unfortunately these unreasonable ideas were not only part of the justification for the war, but also became critical elements of the Administration's prewar thinking about postwar reconstruction. Some in the Bush Administration had convinced themselves that Saddam was the source of all of the ills of the Middle East and that, therefore, any progress on any issue in the region first required Saddam's removal. This was a key piece of the neoconservative support for Laurie Mylroie's bizarre claims that Saddam was responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, as well as a number of other attacks.[8] Likewise, during the 1990s, this author personally heard individuals who would later become senior Bush Administration officials insist that Saddam's opposition had doomed American efforts to make peace between the Arabs and the Israelis in the 1980s. In so doing, they simply dismissed all of the evidence that no Arab leader except Hosni Mubarak had been more supportive of the peace process than Saddam during that period. This was the basis of the neo-conservative refrain that "the road to Jerusalem runs through Baghdad." Likewise, this mistaken conviction was part of the reason that Washington quickly shifted its attention from Afghanistan to Iraq, in the belief that Saddam somehow stood behind both the Taliban and al-Qa'ida. It is certainly the case that Administration figures regularly played fast and loose with the paltry evidence suggesting any kind of relationship between Saddam and bin Ladin, but it is also the case that they did so because they were certain that it existed, even if there was no evidence to support it and most of the evidence available suggested the opposite.[9]

As bad as some of these rationales for war may have been, far more damaging was the way in which these rationalizations influenced the Administration's senior leadership regarding the necessity and demands of postwar reconstruction. At bottom, many in the Administration--and virtually all of those leading the march to war--simply did not believe that a major effort at reconstruction was necessary. United States Central Command (CENTCOM), the military command responsible for the war, was told to prepare for humanitarian contingencies such as refugees, but little else. Both the CENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks, and the office of the Secretary of Defense made clear that they wanted to reduce the American military presence in Iraq as quickly as possible, and if there were any serious efforts at nation-building to be made, they were determined that someone else do it.[10] Rumsfeld and other members of the Administration, including even the President, had made it clear that they did not believe that nation-building was the sort of operation in which the U.S. military should be involved.[11] Other members of the Administration, particularly those close to Iraqi National Congress (INC) leader Ahmed Chalabi, saw no need for a major American reconstruction effort, because they hoped to turn the country over to Chalabi and have him run it for the United States.[12]

To make matters worse, officials at the Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of the Vice President (OVP), and some at the National Security Council (NSC) decided that the State Department was "against" the war and would sabotage their plans to run Iraq the way they saw fit and to install Chalabi in power. They worked assiduously to retain complete control over the meager work on postwar reconstruction that was being done and to exclude State Department personnel, offices, and input. Thus one of the many Catch-22s of U.S. prewar planning for postwar Iraq is that while neither the military nor the civilian leadership of the Pentagon was interested in nation-building, they were absolutely determined to exclude those agencies that were both more willing and more able. While State's capacity to handle postwar reconstruction and nation-building probably would also have proven inadequate without massive international cooperation, it was still orders of magnitude beyond what DoD possessed. Instead, the Defense Department put together a small team (about 200 people at the time of the invasion) led by retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner to handle postwar reconstruction--at least temporarily--until a presidential envoy could be appointed.[13] Garner was not even asked to head this postwar transition team until January 9, 2003, a little more than two months before the start of the war. He was prevented from cooperating with Central Command planners, and many of his requests for key personnel were denied. Garner and his team wanted desperately to do the right thing, and some were quite able, but they started with everything stacked against them.

Once again, this was particularly true with regard to the intellectual foundations of the Administration's approach to war, which underlay all of the planning. Most of the Administration's chief Iraq hawks shared a deeply naive view that the fall of Saddam and his top henchmen would have relatively little impact on the overall Iraqi governmental structure. They assumed that Iraq's bureaucracy would remain intact and would therefore be capable of running the country and providing Iraqis with basic services. They likewise assumed that the Iraqi armed forces would largely remain cohesive and would surrender whole to U.S. forces. While the Administration does not seem to have intended to use the Iraqi army to secure the population, they believed that because it would remain cohesive, there would be little threat from disgruntled soldiers joining organized crime or insurgent groups, as actually happened.[14]

As has been documented by many other authors, the result of all this was a fundamental lack of attention to realistic planning for the postwar environment. As it was assumed that the Iraqis would be delighted to be liberated--with no allowance either for those who opposed the invasion, those glad but wary of U.S. intentions, or those simply looking to take advantage of the dictator's fall to grab as much loot as they could--little thought was given to security requirements after Saddam's fall. This was carried over into a larger dearth of planning for the provision of security and basic services in the mistaken belief that Iraqi political institutions would remain largely intact and therefore able to handle those responsibilities--especially after America's Iraqi friends (particularly Chalabi) were installed in Baghdad in Saddam's place. Although senior military commanders decided that the State Department would be responsible for reconstruction, thereby alleviating themselves of any responsibility for it, the Department of Defense prohibited Garner's team from interacting with Franks' staff, while also working to minimize its cooperation with the State Department. Across the board, planning was disjointed, inadequate, and unrealistic.[15]

NEGLECT AND STUBBORNNESS

All of these bad ideas--the products of arrogance and ignorance--began to bear tragic fruit during and immediately after the invasion of Iraq. There were certainly problems with the operation itself. The assumption that virtually no Iraqis would fight proved inaccurate. Most did not, but enough did to create some serious headaches for commanders throughout the chain of command. There were too few Coalition troops, which meant that long supply lines were vulnerable to attack by Iraqi irregulars, and the need to mask entire cities at times took so much combat power that it brought the entire offensive to a halt. American technology at times fell victim to simple Iraqi countermeasures--such as barrages of small arms fire that effectively neutralized the fearsome Apache attack helicopters that the United States had hoped would pulverize Iraqi mechanized formations. Nevertheless, the invasion itself was, overall, a remarkably successful operation, resulting in the capture of Baghdad and the fall of the regime in a little less than four weeks.[16]

Yet the invasion was not the war. It was merely the beginning of the war. Unfortunately, the prewar planning guidance handed down from the civilian chiefs in the Department of Defense now dictated what the military forces on the ground did and did not do, and that meant that they did far too little.

Almost immediately, the mistaken assumptions and inadequate planning for postwar Iraq began to plague U.S. actions. Combat units found themselves in charge of large urban areas with no sense of what to do, whom to contact, or how else to get help. As no orders were issued to the troops to prevent looting and other criminal activity--since it was mistakenly assumed that there would not be such problems--no one did so. The result was an outbreak of lawlessness throughout the country that resulted in massive physical destruction coupled with a stunning psychological blow to Iraqi confidence in the United States, from neither of which has the country recovered.

It was at that moment, in April 2003, that the United States created the most fundamental problems in Iraq. At that point, having torn down Saddam Hussein's tyranny, there was nothing to take its place; nothing to fill the military, political, and economic void left by the regime's fall. The result was that the United States created a failed state and a power vacuum, which even as of this writing has not been properly filled. That power vacuum and that failed state allowed an insurgency to develop in the Sunni tribal community of Western Iraq, left the Shi'a communities to be slowly taken over by vicious sectarian militias, spawned organized crime rings across the country, and prevented the development of governmental institutions capable of providing Iraqis with the most basic services such as clean water, sanitation, electricity, and a minimally functioning economy capable of generating basic employment. The persistence of these problems over time led to the emergence of low-level civil war in Iraq, and it now threatens to plunge the country into a Bosnia- or Lebanon-like maelstrom.

Compounding the problem, the Administration concurrently took a number of steps that discouraged those who might have helped them to address these failings by helping to build new political, economic, and security institutions in Iraq capable of replacing Saddam's fallen regime. Such capabilities were resident in segments of the UN bureaucracy and, to an even greater extent, in scores of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have assisted in nation-building around the world in the past. However, the Bush Administration's stubborn insistence that the United Nations be denied overall authority for the reconstruction, and that the international community conform to American dictates in Iraq effectively denied the United States their assistance.

It is not true, as many seem to believe, that the Administration simply barred the United Nations and other states from participating in the reconstruction. However, Washington did impose conditions on that involvement that made it unattractive for the UN, international NGOs, and a long list of foreign governments to participate. Even countries that disagreed with the United States on the decision to invade Iraq were eager to assist with the reconstruction--indeed some, like Germany, hoped that their fulsome participation in reconstruction would help assuage the anger that their opposition to the war itself had created in the United States. Unfortunately, another pathology of the senior leadership of the Bush Administration was that most of them shared an abiding antipathy to the UN and other international organizations. This, coupled with their ignorant but adamant belief that a major reconstruction effort would be unnecessary in Iraq, hardened them in their stand-offish approach to the UN and other members of the international community. Washington insisted that the reconstruction be headed by an American and that all UN and international personnel be integrated into the American effort.

However, neither the UN, the international NGOs, nor many other governments were interested in working under these conditions. Most UN bureaucrats disliked the Bush Administration (if not the United States altogether) and the invasion of Iraq to begin with. Moreover, they and members of the Security Council were loathe to make the UN subordinate to the United States given both the greater resources and success of the UN in nation-building operations in the past.[17] The United Nations provided only a small staff of several hundred people and most of the NGOs either stayed away or sent only small numbers of personnel themselves. To its credit, the United Nations did send one priceless commodity: Sergio Vieira de Mello, an outstanding international administrator who had headed the successful effort to stabilize East Timor in the years before the invasion of Iraq. To the extent that the United Nations and the rest of the international community participated meaningfully in the reconstruction of Iraq in the days after the fall of Baghdad, it was largely because Sergio de Mello was determined to make it work. When de Mello was killed in August 2003 by a truck-bomb attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad, the Secretariat immediately reduced its presence in Iraq to little more than a skeleton crew on the grounds that the United States, which had insisted on retaining complete control of the effort, was failing in its most basic task: providing the security that was the sine qua non of any reconstruction efforts.

In retrospect, the meager participation of the international community was an important factor in the many failures of reconstruction. The United Nations, through its various agencies, can call upon a vast network of personnel and resources vital to various aspects of nation-building. One of the greatest problems the United States faced was that it simply did not have enough people who knew how to do all of the things necessary to rebuild the political and economic systems of a shattered nation. The UN, in contrast, had worked with thousands of people with such skills in Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Had the UN asked those people to help in Iraq, they probably would have come. In contrast, they proved mostly unwilling to answer the same call from the Bush Administration, especially when Washington rudely and repeatedly emphasized that reconstruction in Iraq would be done their way and no other. The ability to tap into a much larger network of people with desperately needed skills, by itself, was a crucial virtue of the UN that was lost to the United States out of sheer hubris.[18]

PANIC AND HASTE

It did not take long after the fall of Saddam's regime for reality to intrude upon the pipe dreams of the Administration. It quickly became clear that Iraq's governmental apparatus had largely collapsed. The people had all gone home and most were not reporting to work. The buildings had been ransacked by looters. The equipment had largely been stolen or destroyed. Many of the files had been destroyed, stolen, or acquired for other nefarious purposes. A comprehensive survey undertaken by the new Iraqi minister of water resources after he took office in late 2003, found that the ministry had lost 60 percent of its equipment--from pencils to massive dredgers--in the looting.[19] The Administration did look briefly to Ahmed Chalabi and his INC to fill the void, flying Chalabi and 400 of his personnel into al-Nasiriyah early in the war. However, the paltry numbers of followers that Chalabi could scrape together compared to what he claimed, and the increasing evidence that those on the inside did not know or care for him, made it impossible to simply hand the reins of power to Chalabi and expect that he could manage the state. What's more, it was equally clear that the United States lacked the personnel with the expertise to step in and fill these roles--and the international community, which did have such personnel, was not willing to provide them unless the Administration agreed to major changes in its handling of the postwar reconstruction.

The result was a sort of panic in both Washington and Baghdad, as it became apparent that postwar realities were radically different from the Administration's prewar expectations. Initially, the panic took the form of criticism of Jay Garner. In essence, the first response of those in Washington who had devised the vision for the threadbare postwar reconstruction was to blame Garner for not being up to the task. They whispered to the press that it was his execution and not their unrealistic expectations and inadequate preparations that were to blame.

Not surprisingly, Garner was soon on his way out. He was relieved of his charge in June 2003, and replaced by the more senior and more politically savvy L. Paul Bremer. Yet Bremer knew even less about Iraq when he took charge than Garner had, having never handled operations there before and not even having had the benefit of Garner's few months of pre-planning to get a sense of the country. Bremer's early remarks upon arrival in Baghdad were largely focused on the need to privatize Iraqi industry. It was as if he had inherited leadership of an Eastern Europe nation that had just shed Soviet-style Communism--and not an Arab country suddenly freed from war, comprehensive sanctions, and a near-genocidal dictatorship.[20] However, Bremer had another problem to deal with: Washington's demands.

The manifest problems in Iraq--from the looting and anarchy, to the persistent insurgent attacks, to the lack of any progress in restoring basic services--coupled with the lack of progress in finding WMDs, were putting a serious damper on the Administration's ability to claim that it had truly "liberated" Iraq and would quickly be able to leave it a stable, prosperous state. Washington began to put intense pressure on its small, but constantly growing, staff in Baghdad to produce results, and fast. The result was a series of mistaken decisions in the summer and fall of 2003 that further crippled the reconstruction effort.[21]

The best known of these decisions was the disbanding of the Iraqi military and security services. This decision actually requires a bit of explanation in order to understand the problematic facets of it. As Bremer and his senior staff have repeatedly argued, and not incorrectly, "the Iraqi Army disbanded itself." As noted above, and as should have been expected, during and after the war, most Iraqi soldiers simply went home. Thus, to some extent, the decision merely reflected the reality of the situation. Moreover, the Administration's critics are probably wrong in their contention that the Army could have been used to maintain order, and so take the place of the missing Coalition soldiers who should have been there to do so. The Iraqi Army was Saddam's Army--and his security services even more so--and it is very unclear how the population would have reacted to an American decision to use them to clamp down on civilians after the regime's fall. In this author's conversations with Iraqis both inside and outside Iraq since the end of the war, there certainly have been those who suggested that since most of the conscripts were Shi'a and merely following orders, the people would have accepted them as enforcers of law and order after Saddam's fall. However, far more have suggested the opposite. Bremer's team heard the same thing, and an important element in their decision to disband it was to try to send a signal to the people that the old regime was gone, and the Coalition would be starting again from a clean slate to create new institutions without the taint of Saddam.

While this rationale was understandable, it did not mean that the decision was faultless. In fact, there was a major problem, albeit one principally derived from the poor prewar planning rather than from mistakes made by Bremer's team in Baghdad. This was the failure to entice, cajole, or even coerce Iraqi soldiers back to their own barracks or to other facilities where they could be fed, clothed, watched, retrained, and prevented from joining the insurgency, organized crime, or the militias. During its various forays into nation-building in the 1980s and 90s, the United States learned the importance of a Disarm, Demobilize, and Retrain (DDR) program for any reconstruction effort. The purpose of such a program is to take the soldiers and officers of the old army and put them into a long-term program of transition so that they can eventually be reintegrated into the society with the skills needed to find themselves jobs as civilians.

In Iraq, there was no DDR program, nor could one have been pulled together overnight. Doing so would have required places to put those Iraqis (their barracks had been bombed in some cases; looted in every case), money to pay, feed, and otherwise care for them; personnel and supplies to train them; and additional troops to guard them (in both senses of the word). As a result, the Coalition had nothing to offer former Iraqi soldiers and (particularly) officers, who had once enjoyed privileged positions in their society. By abruptly disbanding the military and security services without a DDR program, the United States turned as many as one million Iraqi men loose on the streets with no money, no way of supporting their families, and no skills other than how to use a shovel and a gun. Not surprisingly, many of the Sunni officers were humiliated by how they were treated and went home to their tribes in al-Anbar province and joined--along with their sons, cousins, and nephews--the burgeoning Sunni insurgency. Equally unsurprisingly, many of the rank and file were quickly recruited by the insurgency, by militia leaders, or by organized crime. The result was a massive boost to the forces of instability in the country.[22]

Although the decision to disband the Army without a DDR program is the best known of the rushed decisions made during the summer and fall of 2003, it was hardly the only one, and two other important ones bear mentioning. The first of these was the decision to accelerate massively the training of the new Iraqi Army. When Major General Paul Eaton was given responsibility for setting up a training program in Iraq for the New Iraqi Army, he was told that his goal was to have nine trained battalions (about 10,000 to 12,000 men) at the end of twelve months. This was a realistic goal, and Eaton's plan was fully capable of achieving it. However, soon after the program had started running, Eaton was suddenly ordered to accelerate his training program so that he could produce twenty-seven battalions in only nine months.[23] The reason for this was that the Administration had realized that they were desperately short of troops to fill the security vacuum the United States had created when it toppled Saddam's regime. However, rather than mobilize and deploy additional American soldiers--or do what would be necessary to secure greater participation in the Coalition by other nations--Washington's response was to have Eaton start pumping out as many Iraqi troops as he could, heedless of the fact that the accelerated programs would inevitably produce Iraqi soldiers who were neither properly trained nor fully committed to the mission.

This problem became even more severe with the creation of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) in the fall of 2003. The purpose of the ICDC was to provide local militia forces--like those used successfully in many other counterinsurgency and stability operations around the world--as adjuncts to the national military forces. Again, the basic idea was sound. However, in Washington's fever to churn out more Iraqi soldiers to hold up as proof that no more American or other foreign forces were needed, the Administration insisted on a breakneck pace that virtually eliminated any ability to vet personnel before they were brought into the ICDC. At the same time, training time was cut to just two or three weeks. Not surprisingly, the ICDC turned out to be a total debacle: It had virtually no combat capability, was thoroughly penetrated by the insurgents, militias, and organized crime, and collapsed whenever it was committed to battle.

The last key mistake made in that summer of panic was the decision to create an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which laid the foundation for many of Iraq's current political woes. The experience of nation-building in other states over the past twenty to thirty years left the experts convinced that the process of political reconstruction could not be rushed. In most of these situations, the problem was that there was no readily available pool of leaders who genuinely represented the people. This was especially true in Saddam's Iraq, where he had effectively "decapitated" the population by killing or co-opting any person with the charisma or stature to lead segments of the population and so pose a threat to his rule. In all of these societies, it took years to allow new leaders to emerge from the people. Such men and women had to feel safe enough to want to lead, they had to become known to large groups of people (large enough to get elected to some new position), and then they had to demonstrate their ability to lead in the new systems. What this suggested was the requirement for a period of three to six years of political transition during which sovereignty and ultimate stewardship of the decision-making process resided in an external force--ideally a UN-authorized "high commissioner" or the like, backed by international security forces and NGOs skilled in political and economic reconstruction. These experiences of nation-building had demonstrated that when the process of turning control of the government back to the indigenous population was rushed, the old elites and anyone else with guns inevitably took over the government by buying or bullying the electorate.

Thus, the experts on reconstruction generally urged the inclusion of Iraqi voices in the decision-making process, but not the turning over of decision-making authority--or the appearance of it--to any Iraqi group. Instead, the focus was on a longer timeframe of building a new political system from the ground up over a period of years, during which time an international coalition, blessed by the UN, would retain sovereignty and only delegate authority to new Iraqi political entities as they became ready.[24]

To some extent, that was the intent of some Americans in Iraq. Both State Department personnel and U.S. military officers--particularly those who had served in the Balkans and witnessed UN and NGO personnel in action there--began establishing local governing councils all across Iraq as part of such a bottom-up approach of building local governance capacity first, before moving on to provincial and then national levels. However, the unhappiness of Iraqis, Americans, and others with the course of reconstruction after the fall of Saddam, coupled with the desire of Ahmed Chalabi and his allies to see him installed in power, led Washington to insist on a change. Rather than allowing the bottom-up process the time it needed to succeed, they short-circuited the process and instead opted for a top-down approach, in which a new council of Iraqis (what became the IGC) would work with a fully-empowered American viceroy--Bremer--to run the country.[25] It was a combination of wanting to put the Iraqis out in front so that they would take the heat for the mistakes and problems of reconstruction (some of which were inevitable), and wanting Chalabi in charge even though it had become apparent that he could not get himself elected dog-catcher of Baghdad if he were forced to actually work his way up in a process of bottom-up political reconstruction.[26]

As a result, the United States created the twenty-five-member IGC and gave it an important role in guiding reconstruction. However, because Washington had not allowed enough time--let alone created the circumstances--for genuinely popular figures to emerge, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) simply appointed twenty-five Iraqi leaders well-known to them. Some, like the Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Mas'ud Barzani, truly did represent their constituency. Others, like Shi'a leader 'Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, were at least respected in their community, even if they could not necessarily be trusted to speak for it. Most could not even claim that. Most were entirely unknown--a State Department poll found that only seven of them were known well enough for 40 percent or more of the population to have any opinion of them, positive or negative. In some cases, like Chalabi, they were genuinely disliked. In other cases, the choices were equally unfortunate, because they were nothing more than militia leaders. Many of them used their positions on the IGC to engineer their own further political and military (and financial) aggrandizement, so that membership on the IGC became a ticket to political power for those who might otherwise have had none.

The seeds of a great many of Iraq's problems lay in this arrangement. The IGC set the tone for later Iraqi governments, particularly the transitional governments of Ayad Allawi and Ibrahim Jaafari that followed. Many of the IGC leaders were horribly corrupt, and they stole from the public treasury and encouraged their subordinates to do the same. They cut deals with nefarious figures, many in organized crime. They built up their militias and insinuated them into the various security services. They used the instruments of government to exclude their political rivals from gaining any economic, military, or political power--particularly Chalabi, who gained control of the de-Ba'thification program and used it to exclude large numbers of Sunnis from participating in the new Iraqi government.[27] Because they wrote the first Iraqi constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), this became a document largely suited to their own interests and not necessarily those of the country; and because the TAL became the basis of the subsequent constitution, the constitution carried over some of these problems, while leaving many key issues ambiguous, since delegates could not reach a consensus between what the TAL espoused and what was actually best for Iraq.

This last point raises another problem that resulted from the creation of the IGC: the marginalization of a number of important Iraqi communities, most notably the Sunni tribal segment of the population. The IGC itself included only one Sunni tribal leader, and he was not widely respected in his own community. As a result, the Sunnis saw the IGC as an American instrument for turning the country over to the Kurds and the Shi'a. The Sunnis became increasingly concerned as the members of the IGC and their followers set about using their new positions to steal, expand their political and economic power, and further discredit Sunnis through de-Ba'thification--all the while filling government jobs with their own cronies. All of these strategies had been previously employed by the Sunnis themselves under Saddam; thus, the Sunnis became convinced that in the new Iraq they would be oppressed just as they had once oppressed the Shi'a and the Kurds. More than anything else, this conviction fed the Sunni-based insurgency.[28]

Not everything that Bremer's CPA did was a mistake, however. In November 2003, Bremer and his team appear to have recognized the Frankenstein's monster that had been created in the IGC--something that Bremer reportedly opposed from the start. As a result, they fashioned a new approach to Iraqi participation in the reconstruction and the development of the Iraqi political sector, called the November 15 Agreement for the date that it was finally accepted. The November 15 Agreement received a lot of undeserved bad press. This accord was a very complex formula to produce a new Iraqi legislative and executive body through a bottom-up process of caucuses. The reason for the complexity was that it was designed to exclude the unpopular exiles and militia leaders who had been brought into the power structure through the creation of the IGC and allow for genuinely popular leaders to be elected to new regional and national political bodies.[29]

It is unclear just how well it might have worked, but it was a clever effort to repair the damage done by the creation of the IGC. Unfortunately, its very complexity doomed it. Those members of the IGC who knew they could not get elected in a truly representative system began lobbying heavily with their allies in Washington and in the Green Zone in Baghdad. Meanwhile, the Shi'a militia leaders convinced Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani--the Marja-e Taqlid al-Mutlaq, the most revered figure in Shi'a Islam and the spiritual leader of the Iraqi Shi'a community--to oppose the November 15 Agreement based on the spurious claim that because it did not include direct elections, it was therefore undemocratic and a plot to prevent the Shi'a from realizing their rightful place in Iraqi society. It is far more likely that Sistani just did not understand the agreement and its complex caucus system and allowed various other leaders in the Shi'a community to manipulate him into opposing it because it was a threat to their new power and wealth. Tragically, Sistani's opposition and Washington's machinations doomed the November 15 Agreement, America's best chance to derail the pernicious political system inaugurated by the creation of the IGC in the summer of 2003.

DENIAL

Unfortunately, the mistakes did not end there. As bad as the Administration's prewar assumptions were, as tragic as it was that General Franks and his command did not see the need to stabilize the country, and as badly as the mistakes of the CPA were in compounding these problems, there were still more to come, and these too became critical components in the overall problems besetting the reconstruction.

In 2004-05, the Bush Administration largely convinced itself that the problems besetting Iraq were not as great as their critics claimed. While recognizing that reconstruction had turned out to be more demanding than they had anticipated, they convinced themselves that the problems of the country were simple and straightforward, and so could be addressed by a limited number of simple steps. Of greatest importance, they convinced themselves that solving Iraq's problems did not require any difficult political, economic, or military decisions, and no matter how much the evidence diverged from their theories, they refused to accept reality and give up their theories. In particular, throughout 2004-05, Administration officials believed that the problems besetting Iraq were almost entirely the fault of the Iraqi insurgency, which they maintained was largely driven by al-Qa'ida and by a small number of former regime figures. They insisted that once Iraq held fair and free elections to constitute a new legislature, this would undermine the legitimacy of the insurgency, causing it to whither away, and thus alleviating--if not eliminating--all of the problems.

Unfortunately, none of this was true. Moreover, by insisting that all of the problems of the country were caused by the insurgency--rather than that all of the problems of the country were helping to fuel the insurgency--and that, especially in 2004 and early 2005, the insurgency was really about al-Qa'ida operatives and former regime "dead-enders," the United States concentrated its efforts in the wrong places and on the wrong problems. As a result, the United States not only failed to quash the insurgency, but allowed the rest of the country to fall effectively under the control of sectarian militias and organized crime.

A major manifestation of this fatally misguided approach lay in the realm of military operations. In both counterinsurgency and stability operations,[30] the best course of action is to blanket the entire country with a thick layer of security personnel to protect the population and make it difficult--if not impossible--for insurgents, militias, and criminals to harm the civilian population. That was the strategy that the U.S. military attempted to employ in Iraq immediately after the invasion. However, while numbers are always soft in warfare, historically it has required a rough ratio of twenty security personnel per thousand of the population to create such security in both counterinsurgency and stability operations.[31] Even if one allows that the 70,000 Peshmerga are more than adequate to secure Kurdistan, the rest of Iraq would still require roughly 450,000 troops to achieve such a ratio. It is clear that there were never going to be 450,000 troops available to adequately blanket the entire country,[32] at least not until many years into the future when much larger numbers of competent Iraqi troops would be available. The United States was never willing to commit more than about 150,000 troops, and the Coalition allies never produced more than 20,000. Even by 2006, the actual number of Iraqi troops capable of contributing meaningfully to this operation was probably around 60-80,000.

This gap, and the fact that the Administration had no intention of providing the numbers of troops they required to actually make such a strategy work, became apparent to American military commanders in late 2003. At that point, they faced a choice: They could either concentrate the troops they had available on the areas of insurgent activity to try snuff them out, or they could concentrate those forces in and around Iraqi population centers to try to protect them against insurgents and criminals. Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, the American military commanders made the wrong decision: They chose the former, rather than the latter.

In conventional warfare, the goal is to go on the offensive, take the fight to the enemy, focus on killing "bad guys," and put the enemy on the defensive. In unconventional warfare--including counterinsurgency and stability operations--the only way to win is to do the exact opposite: remain mostly on the defensive, focus on protecting "good guys," and create safe spaces in which political and economic reform/reconstruction can take place--thereby undermining popular support for the "bad guys." The U.S. military, and particularly the U.S. Army, has never liked unconventional warfare. The small number of officers who understood it were typically relegated to the special forces and rarely ever rose to prominent command positions. Those who did rise to the top were those steeped in the principles of conventional warfare, which Army ideology insisted was universally applicable, including in unconventional operations, even when centuries of history made it abundantly clear that this was not the case.

Thus for nearly all of 2004 and 2005, Coalition forces were inordinately concentrated in western Iraq, romping around the Sunni triangle trying to catch and kill insurgents. The results were disastrous. First, because the insurgents were always willing to flee to fight again another day, these operations had virtually no impact on the insurgency overall, which actually grew stronger as ham-fisted American raids antagonized ever more Sunni tribesmen, convincing them to join the insurgency.[33] Second, because the insurgency grew stronger and stronger over time despite the massive exertions of the U.S. military, Iraqis increasingly began to see the United States as a paper tiger, with a variety of detrimental consequences. Last, because too many Coalition forces were off playing "whack-a-mole" with insurgents in the sparsely populated areas of western Iraq, the rest of the country was relatively denuded of troops--indeed, there were vast swathes of southern Iraq where one might not see Coalition or Iraqi Army forces for hours if not days--which allowed the militias and organized crime rings to gradually take control over neighborhoods and villages all across the rest of Iraq. Many of the current problems with the virtually unchecked insurgent attacks on the Shi'a, the explosive growth of vicious Shi'a--and Sunni, and Kurd, and other--militias, and the spiraling sectarian violence among them, can all be traced to this mistaken approach.

To make matters worse, not until 2006 did the U.S. military even acknowledge that their strategic concept--and tactics--in Iraq were not working. Despite numerous criticisms from both inside and outside the armed forces arguing that a conventional approach to the unconventional mission of securing Iraq was bound to fail--and was manifestly failing--the military refused to give up its strategy. Only at the start of 2006, when Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli arrived in Baghdad to take over the corps command there, did the U.S. military command in Baghdad devise a true counterinsurgency/stability operations approach to dealing with the security problems of the country. This effort began with what became known as "the Baghdad Security Plan," which was designed to concentrate large numbers of Iraqi and Coalition troops in Baghdad and employed the proper tactics to secure the capital and allow political and economic reconstruction efforts to begin to take hold there.

It was a brilliant plan, the first that could have actually accomplished what it set out to, but when it was finally approved in the summer of 2006, Chiarelli was given only about 70,000 mostly Iraqi troops--and then mostly Iraqi police, the worst of their security services--not the roughly 125,000 that he would have needed (and reportedly requested). Moreover, Chiarelli's plan called for a fully integrated military and civilian chain of command with adequate numbers of civilian personnel to match their American military and Iraqi civilian counterparts--two more things sorely lacking in Iraq from the very beginning--but none of this was forthcoming. As of this writing, the Baghdad security plan appeared to be enjoying some real success in those pockets of Baghdad where mixed formations of Iraqi and American units were present, but accomplishing little everywhere else. It too seems likely to fail as a result of the too little, too late approach Washington has taken toward the reconstruction of Iraq from start to finish.

At the political level, the United States actually began to do a bit better starting in 2005. The appointment of Zalmay Khalilzad as ambassador to Baghdad to succeed Bremer as the head of the civilian side of the U.S. reconstruction effort proved to be an inspired choice. Khalilzad did not have every skill that one would have wanted for that post--perhaps no mortal could--but he was a superb negotiator, and he understood some critically important basic truths. He knew that the Sunnis had to be brought back into the government to end the insurgency. He knew that real power-sharing arrangements had to be crafted so that the major figures in Iraq would commit to supporting the governmental structure. He also knew that the Iraqi people needed to be provided with basic security and basic services or they would begin to turn to warlords and militia leaders instead. As a result, he worked tirelessly to force a new national reconciliation agreement that might accomplish the first two goals and to make it possible to have a government that could partner with a new American military approach to achieve the third.

However, this has proven to be a Herculean (perhaps even Sisyphean) labor. The problem derives from the flawed decisions to rapidly create the IGC in 2003--an Iraqi executive body, manned mostly by those best known to the United States--and in doing so adopt a top-down approach to political reconstitution rather than the bottom-up approach that past experiences in nation-building demonstrated to be essential. Having brought exiles and militia leaders into the government and given them positions of power, it became virtually impossible to get them out, and even more difficult to convince them to make compromises. The militia leaders used their positions to maintain and expand their power, at the expense both of their rivals who were not in the government and of the central government itself.

The problem is most easily understood in this way. What was most needed in Iraq by early 2004 and on through 2005 and 2006, were basic security and basic services for the Iraqi people (electricity, water, sanitation, gasoline, as well as jobs, medical care, and in some cases food). The militia leaders exerted their power by laying claim to areas of the country that the government's security forces--and the Americans--could not occupy or patrol. They then built public support by providing the security and basic services that the government could not, explicitly following the model employed so successfully by Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. The best way for the federal government to rid the country of the problem of the militias was to acquire the capacity to provide both the security and the services for the Iraqi people so that they would not have to rely on the militias. However, with the militia leaders running the central government, they had absolutely no interest in having it acquire such capacity, because doing so would mean the loss of their own power bases. Thus they had every incentive to continue to use their posts in the government to reward their cronies, steal as much from the public coffers as they could, and otherwise block their adversaries from doing so--without lifting a finger to actually address the most desperate needs of the Iraqi state. Likewise, they had no incentive to cut real deals with their adversaries, particularly the Sunni tribal leaders, because doing so would bring them into the government, giving them access to the same power and graft, and thereby creating a threat to their growing control of the country and its resources.

Khalilzad and his colleagues struggled against this conundrum unflaggingly, but the challenges were enormous. There were too few truly selfless Iraqis devoted to making their nation safe, stable, and strong again, and too many simply looking to line their own pockets as best they could while preventing their rivals from doing the same. Thus, on the political side the United States came to the right idea much sooner than was the case on the military side, but the initial mistakes of the wrong ideas created a set of circumstances that has so far made it impossible to actually achieve what they knew to be the right goals.

CONCLUSIONS

The summary above barely scratches the surface of the many tragic mistakes made in the American reconstruction of Iraq. The United States has no one to blame but itself. There was so much potential in Iraq. It took so many needless blunders to drive the country to its current state. As of this writing, in late 2006, Iraq is caught in the swift current of a river of American mistakes. They are headed quickly toward the falls, and the leaders the United States put in power in Baghdad lack not just the ability, but even the desire to prevent them from going over. As it was in the beginning, the end of this story is entirely in the hands of the United States. This Iraqi leadership will not save the country. Only a dramatic change in approach by Washington can do so.

In nearly every previous instance of state failure and civil war, observers on the scene and experts elsewhere failed to recognize that they had passed the point of no return--when disaster became inevitable--until long after they had done so. As of this writing, the situation in Iraq seems bleak, but there are still areas of progress that could lead one to be hopeful that all is not lost. In other words, it does not yet look like the point of no return has been crossed. However, it is essential that the United States recognize that it is perilously close. At the very least, we should not assume that the United States has much longer to turn things around.